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(i)
SUMMARY
This thesis explores the behaviour and performance of labour- 
managed firms in a capitalist economy through comparisons between 
labour-managed and capitalist enterprises and by examining interactions, 
market and non-market, between the two organisational forms. These 
investigations are pursued in the context of monopsonistic or 
oligopsonistic labour markets and product market duopoly. The scarcity 
of managerial skills may mean that day to day control is delegated 
to a specialist. We demonstrate that the existence of managerial 
discretion can have important consequences for the short-run behaviour 
of labour-managed firms. Finally we consider the factors which determine 
whether labour-management will emerge under capitalism. This involves 
an assessment of the theoretical and empirical literature on the relative 
efficiency of the two modes of production, and then an analysis of 
whether the outcome depends purely on relative efficiency, or whether 
distributional considerations are also important.
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ICHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
I.I LABOUR-MANAGED AND CAPITALIST PRODUCTION
Our starting point is the recognition that a firm is not merely 
a cooperating group of producers, rather it is a group with a 
particular organisational structure and set of property rights.
In particular we are interested in the distinction between a capitalist 
firm (CF) and a labour-managed firm (LMF).
The former is the traditional enterprise of microeconomic 
theory and is referred to variously as the entrepreneurial firm, the owner- 
managed firm and the classical capitalist f i r m . F o l l o w i n g  Gravelle 
and Rees (1981) its defining characteristic is taken to be "...the 
existence of a central figure, the owner, employer or entrevveneuv, who:
(a) enters into a contract with each of the individuals who supply 
productive services which specifies the nature and duration of 
those services and the renumeration for them;
(b) either takes decisions, or has the right to insist that decisions 
are taken, in hia interests, subject to his contractual obligations;
(c) has the right to the residual Income from production, i.e. the 
excess of revenue over payments to suppliers of productive 
services made under the terms of their contracts;
(d) can transfer his right in the residual income, and his rights 
and obligations under the contracts with suppliers of productive 
services, to another individual;
2(e) has the power to direct the activities of the suppliers of productive 
services, subject to the terms and conditions of their contracts;
(f) can change the membership of the producing group not only by
terminating contracts but also by entering into new contracts 
and adding to the group", (p.151) (Emphasis in original)
A LMF is different in two fundamental respects. First, the 
workforce, or "membership", take collective responsibility for 
negotiating the contracts and the other aspects of operating the firm. 
Control is democratic, on the basis of one person one vote. This 
does not, however, mean that full group discussion is required for 
every decision, since authority for day to day control may be delegated. 
Secondly, any residual income or loss, which in this case is revenue 
minus non-labour costs, accrues to the membership collectively.
In the CF we saw that labour is simply treated as a hired input.
Each of these enterprise types has, separately, been subjected 
to considerable theoretical analysis. On the other hand the interesting 
possibility that both may coexist within an economy has received little 
explicit attention. This is the focus of the present thesis. Specifically, 
our concern is with LMFs operating in an economy where production pre­
dominantly takes place in capitalist enterprises. This concern emanates 
from two recent developments. First of all, LMFs have been entering 
policy discussions with increasing frequency. For some the question 
is whether they might play a useful shott-lerm counter-cyclical role, 
whilst others, who view the current recession as symptomatic of deep- 
rooted problems, are interested in whether self-management at the
3enterprise level should form part of a fundamental restructuring of the
economy. Among the latter group there are also those who regard economic
( 2 )democracy as a necessary condition for a democratic society.
Secondly, a number of capitalist economies already contain significant 
numbers of enterprises which, whilst not always "pure" LMFs as defined
above, do exhibit sufficient degrees of participation and residual
(3)sharing to distinguish them from capitalist enterprises. Moreover,
as we shall see in the following section, these "cooperative" sectors 
are in many cases expanding rapidly.
1.- COOPERATIVE SECTORS WITHIN CAPITALIST ECONOMIES
Estrin (1985) has recently brought together information from 
a variety of sources to provide the most detailed picture to date of 
cooperatives operating in Western industrial economies. In this section 
we simply pick out some of the main findings.
First of all, we see from table 1.1 that a number of countries 
nave significant cooperative sectors. By far the largest in any western 
economy is the Italian sector which in 1981 comprised an estimated 
427,900 workers in just over 11,000 enterprises. In terms of employment 
this is about thirteen times the French level. The table also reveals 
rapid growth since 1970 and especially since the mid 1970's. In Italy, 
for example, cooperative employment doubled from 1975 to 1981, and in 
the U.K. and Holland the rate of growth was higher still, although in 
each of these latter cases the initial employment level was low. Even 
the slowest growing sector, that in France, expanded by 13% over the period 
1975 to 1982.
Information on the size of cooperatives and their industrial 
distribution is given in tables 1.2 and 1.3 respectively. In France,
Italy and the U.K. approximately a third of cooperatives are engaged 
in manufacturing. Within this category, Estrin points out that the 
majority seem to be in sectors where production is likely to be labour- 
intensive. The remaining two-thirds of cooperatives are involved in 
•*’rher building or services, with the split varying markedly between 
countries. This industrial picture is reflected in table 1.3 where
5we see that the majority of cooperatives are small. In France, for 
example, 45% of cooperatives employ fewer than 10 workers and 88% 
have no more than 50. In the U.K., they tend to be smaller still, 
with 71% having less than 10 workers and 95% less than 50.
Finally, table 1.4 presents, for France and the U.K., a 
breakdown of new cooperative formation according to whether they were 
set up from scratch or converted capitalist firms. The latter would 
comprise collapsed firms and those where, for one reason or another, 
the owners decided to transform a successful enterprise into a cooperative. 
The John Lewis Partnership is an example of the latter. In France 
approximately 60% of new cooperatives in recent years were set up from 
scratch, although because these tend to be small relative to converted 
firms, they account for less than a third of the new cooperative jobs 
created. In the U.K., with the exception of 1975, virtually all 
cooperative formation and the vast majority of employment is accounted 
for by those starting from scratch. Estrin suggests that this may 
be explained by the role of recently established support agencies.
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7TABLE 1.2 DISTRIBUTION OF COOPERATIVES BY SIZE
FRANCE (1982)
Number of Workers 7. COOPS % WORKERS
1 - 9 45 7
10 - 50 43 30
51 - 100 5 11
> 100 7 52
U.K. (1980)
Number of Workers % COOPS
1 - 9  71
10 - 19 16
2 0 - 4 9  8
5 0 - 9 9  2
100 - 249 2
250 1
Source Estrin (1985)
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9Table 1.4 MODE OF COOPERATIVE FORMATION IN FRANCE AND THE U.K.
FROM SCRATCH CONVERSIONS
Z FIRMS % WORKERS % FIRMS % WORKERS
FRANCE
1977 55 25 45 75
1978 55 37 45 63
1979 66 40 34 60
1980 64 28 36 72
1981 58 30 42 70
1982 57 28 43 72
(Jan-May) 
U.K.
1975 0 0 100 100
1976 88 63 12 37
1977 92 92 8 8
1978 96 98 4 2
1979 97 96 3 4
1980 86 69 14 21
1981 82 80 18 20
Source Estriu (1985)
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1.3 AN OVERVIEW
Although the impetus for the now considerable volume of LMF 
literature was provided by the labour-managed sectors of socialist 
countries, particularly Yugoslavia, much of the work is equally applicable 
to LMFs operating in capitalist economies. For example, we know a 
great deal about responses to changes in demand, the impact of uncertainty 
and the implications of different financing arrangements. In this 
thesis, however, the intention is, for the most part, to concentrate 
on analysis which has specific relevance to capitalist economies. First 
of all, we shall make explicit comparisons between the behaviour and 
performance of CFs and LMFs. Secondly, market interactions between 
the two types of firm will be explored, and, finally, we consider the 
possibility that capitalist organisation has an indirect influence 
on LMFs through the supportive institutions and technology which have 
evolved under capitalism.
The starting point for a large part of the theoretical literature 
on LMFs is the classic paper by Ward (1958) which suggested that LMF 
behaviour can be analysed using the conventional neoclassical framework, 
but with the maximisation of income per member replacing profit 
maximisation as the assumed maximand. One of the central themes has been 
to compare the equilibrium of this "Illyrian" LMF with that of a CF 
operating in the same product and capital markets with the same technology, 
but facing an exogeneousjcompetitively-determined, wage rate. It the 
product market is perfectly competitive then both firms can be shown 
to have identical long-run equilibria.but if monopoly pertains then income 
per worker would exceed the wage rate, but the LMF produces a lower 
level of output than its capitalist twin. A surprising feature of
11
these comparisons is the ubiquitous assumption of perfect competition 
in the labour market. Given that we might expect the treatment of the 
labour input to be a possible source of differences in behaviour, it 
would seem to be important to examine the implications of labour market 
imperfections. The thesis begins therefore with a consideration of 
labour-market monopsony power.
In chapter 2 we first of all examine the equilibria of both 
a CF and a LMF facing an upward-sloping labour supply schedule. This 
reveals that the usual result concerning their relative output levels 
is capable of being reversed. The second half of the chapter explores 
the effects on short-run employment adjustment in the LMF. Although 
its relevance is not restricted to capitalist economies this is a topic 
which has been the subject of considerable interest following Ward's 
demonstration of the "perverse" supply response of the Illyrian firm. 
Chapter 3 extends the analysis to oligopsony and the process of entry 
into labour markets, which allows us, among other things, to investigate 
market interactions between the two types of firm. In the following 
chapter the focus is wholly on interactions, but in the product rather 
than labour market. Using a simple duopoly model, some interesting 
results are obtained with regard to Cournot equilibrium and Stackelberg 
leadership-followership.
The Illyrian LMF, we noted above, is the analogue to the proft- 
tnaximising CF. A frequent criticism of the latter model is that, 
particularly in tne case of large corporations, it tails to take account 
of the interests of those who actually have day to day control, namely 
managers. Numerous alternative models have been proposed in which 
managerial discretion plays a central role. Given that management
12
skills are concentrated among a small section of the workforce in 
capitalist economies, LMFs may also decide to delegate the managerial 
role to a specialist. In Chapter 5 we demonstrate that managerial 
discretion may have important consequences for short-run LMF behaviour.
The remainder of the thesis is concerned with the much larger 
question of what factors determine whether LMFs will emerge in a 
capitalist economy. In chapter 6 we consider the efficiency of the 
two modes of production. This requires that the "black box" treatment 
of the firm be dispensed with and that the production process, the 
nature of contracting, and the utility derived from work be brought 
to the centre of analysis. The theoretical discussion is followed 
by a review of the rapidly expanding empirical literature in this 
area. Whilst a number of authors argue that it is relative efficiency 
alone which dictates the choice between organisational forms, others 
claim that distributional considerations are also important. This 
fundamental issue is explored in chapter 7.
Finally, a short concluding chapter summarises the main findings
of the thesis.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
1. The latter is due to Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
2. Vanek (1971) regards both political and economic democracy as 
necessary conditions for social stability
3. These cooperatives may for example take on some hired workers, 
and not all members may be workers. For further discussion 
see chapter 6.
14
CHAPTER 2
LABOUR MARKET MONOPSONY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
A CF has monoposony power when, as a buyer facing many potential 
sellers, it has latitude in fixing the wage rate due to an upward- 
sloping labour supply schedule. For convenience we shall also refer 
to a LMF in this situation as a monopsonist even although it admits 
members rather than hires workers and hence its behaviour, unlike 
that of the CF, is frequently unaffected by the supply curve.
Samuelson (1970) recognises that monopsony power may exist in 
some areas of agriculture but argues in general that "...it is more 
important in isolated places like the tin mines of Bolivia or the 
lumber camps of American history, than it is in a modern economy 
where people are, in fact, mobile in moving to better opportunities"
(p. 562). Even were monopsony power to be limited to such cases it 
would merit attention, but there are a number of reasons for thinking 
it may be a more general phenomenon, even in a "modern economy".
Firstly, imperfect worker information on the existence and nature of 
alternative jobs may convey a degree of monopsony power to firms.
Addison and Siebert (1979) report a number of questionnaire studies 
which suggest that workers do only have limited information on alternative 
opportunities. Secondly, there are many social and institutional 
barriers to geographical mobility. For example a recent empirical 
study by Hughes and McCormick (198A) concludes, amongst other things,
15
Chat "...council tenancy inhibits migration by either reducing the 
probability that search, once begun, is successfully completed, or by 
considerably extending the time required and thus the cost of arranging 
the migration. It is an unfortunate and striking feature of the British 
housing system that migration is even more arduous to arrange from the 
main category of rental housing than it is from owner-occupation" 
(p.123). Finally, the literature on segmented labour markets emphasises 
the barriers to mobility even within a region. Empirical evidence 
from the United States has pointed to the existence of monopsony power 
in markets for newspaper workers (Landon, 1970), teachers (Landon 
and Baird, 1971) and nurses (Link and Landon, 1975) . In each case the 
inclusion of an employer concentration term in cross-section wage 
equations suggests that higher levels of concentration are associated 
with lower wages. On both theoretical and empirical grounds, then, 
it seems important to consider labour market monopsony power as part 
of an analysis of LMFs in a capitalist economy.
As noted in the introductory chapter, a central theme in 
the literature is to compare the equilibria of a LMF and a CF 
operating in the same markets with the same technology. In the 
following section we show that the replacement of the exogenous wage 
rate in these comparisons by an upward-sloping labour supply curve 
has important consequences. A second area of concern in the literature 
is the criteria used by LMFs when contemplating reductions in the size 
of the membership. Section 2.3 demonstrates that, once again, the 
shape of the labour supply schedule is an important determinant of 
LMF behaviour. A short conclusion completes the chapter.
16
2.2. LMF AND CF MONOPSONY EQUILIBRIA
To examine the implications of monopsony for comparisons 
of Illyrian LMF and profit-maximising CF equilibria we take the 
simplest model in which both enterprise types produce an identical 
product Q subject to an identical production function in which the 
number of workers, N is the only variable input. In order to focus 
solely on the impact of monopsony each firm is assumed to operate in 
identical but separate product markets. Both firms have the same 
fixed costs of production, F.
The objective of the CF is to
Max ir = R - wN - F (2.1)
N
where R = P.Q
w = wage rate
subject to P = P(Q) with P^ « 0
Q = Q(N) with Qn > 0, Qjjj, < 0 
w = g(N) with g^ > 0 .
Maximisation yields the expression:
= w + Nw n (2.2)
or R^ = w(l + l/d>) (2.3)
where is the elasticity of labour supply. Thus under conditions
of monopsony power in the labour market, the wages received by workers 
will be below their marginal revenue product. This equilibrium can 
now be contrasted with that of an Illyrian LMF.
17
The objective of an Illyrian LMF is to:
Max y = — — (2.4)
N N
subject to P * P(Q) with P^ s 0
Q = Q(N) with QN > 0, < 0
y 5 g(N) with gN > 0
Given the existence of fixed costs and with the above production 
and product market assumptions the y schedule has the general shape 
depicted in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1
Two kinds of equilibrium are possible.
The first is where the labour supply constraint is binding, 
that is, it prevents the LMF attaining the maximum of the income per
18
member schedule. Domar (1966) refers to this as a condition of "moderate 
labour shortage". This situation is shown in Figure 2.1 together 
with the CF monopsonist equilibrium. From (2.2) we see that the CF 
employs Nc workers at a wage w1". From (2.1) and (2.4) we obtain:
it = (y-w)N (2.5)
so that provided the CF is earning positive profits we must have
c cy > w at N and hence y(N) must cut g(N) to the right of N .
Thus, where the labour supply constraint is binding on the LMF 
and if the CF can earn positive profits,then the LMF equilibrium 
(N^, y^) produces both higher employment and higher worker incomes than 
does the CF. If the CF could only earn zero profits then the two 
equilibria would be identical, since y(N) would be tangential to g(N).
Suppose now that the labour supply constraint is not binding 
on the LMF. Domar suggests that the LMF equilibrium would be at the 
intersection of labour supply and income per member schedules. However, 
there is no reason why an income per member maximising firm would expand 
membership beyond the Illyrian equilibrium and hence the latter is
used in our comparisons. Figures 2.2a and 2.2b demonstrate that we 
L C L Ccan have either N > N or N < N in equilibrium depending on 
whether the marginal outlay curve cuts the y(N) schedule to the left 
or right of its maximum. In both cases worker incomes will be higher in
the LMF.
19
Figure 2.2a
Figure 2.2b
20
A non-binding supply constraint, also raises an interesting issue 
concerning the identities, or characteristics, of the membership of 
a LMF. The labour supply function depicts the minimum income at which 
the various workers in the labour market would be willing to work for 
the LMF. Since the supply of workers exceeds the membership level, 
LMF's with the same y and N can differ with respect to the 
distribution of "reservation incomes" among the membership. It will 
be seen later that this can have important consequences for short-run 
membership adjustment.
In this section two results have been obtained. Firstly, if, 
as a result of monopsony power, a CF is able to earn positive profits 
then income per worker in a LMF will exceed the wage paid in the CF.
As noted earlier the same would be true if the source of profit was 
product market power. Secondly the equilibrium employment and output 
levels may be greater or less than in the CF. The former possibility 
also carries with it the possibility that the deadweight welfare loss 
will be less with the LMF and contrasts with the product market 
monopoly case.
What caveats should be attached to those results? A major 
limitation is the assumption of identical production functions. The 
debate on the relative efficiency of the two modes of production is 
addressed in Chapter 6. What we have shown here is that, whatever 
efficiency differences there might be, any comparative analysis of the 
two types of firm must take account of conditions in the labour market. 
A second assumption that has been made is that firms are not able to 
discriminate among workers in making payments. If either the LMF or 
CF were able to discriminate then it would appear that output and 
employment will expand. Inegalitarian cooperatives have been analysed
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by Domar (1966), Meade (1972) and others. However, a danger is that 
if discrimination takes place there may be consequences which cannot 
be accommodated by those models. Thus for example "...the social 
situation can be rather difficult" (Domar 1966, p.744) or the LMF's 
"essential character is weakened" and "a number of LMFs which began 
hiring labour as a short-run expendient degenerated into capitalist­
like firms fairly quickly" (Ireland and Law 1982, p.24). Hence we 
shall retain the assumption that all members are treated equally and 
note in addition the possible shortcomings of the neoclassical analysis 
employed thus far. There may be less danger in permitting a CF to 
discriminate where possible (perhaps between males and females?), 
but even here we should note Reich's (1978) argument that CFs use 
wage differentials as a means of reducing solidarity among the workforce.
A final point to consider is whether, in a situation of excess 
labour supply as depicted in figures 3a and 3b, the Illyrian maximand is 
appropriate. An alternative possibility is that the LMF may take some 
social responsibility for expanding employment and hence maximise 
U ” U(y,N). Such a model has been analysed by Law (1977). Altruistic 
behaviour by the LMF may therefore be particularly plausible where 
there is a tight-knit community. Wiles (1977, p.74) has argued in 
relation to Yugoslavia, that the traditional Illyrian analysis breaks 
down in country places where a neighbourhood has only one factory since 
the existing labour force is now more concerned in getting jobs for 
its family than in increasing its own income. An example from a 
capitalist economy is the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain which 
include the expansion of employment among their stated objectives.
In general, however, consideration of social objectives may take place 
at a level above that of the individual enterprise.
22
2.3 MEMBERSHIP ADJUSTMENT IN THE SHORT-RUN
In this section we examine the implications of an upward sloping 
labour supply schedule for membership adjustment by both the traditional 
Illyrian LMF and more recent models which incorporate compensation 
schemes or voting procedures.
Consider first the comparative static response to a change in 
either P or F. It is well known that in the simple single output, 
single variable input model an Illyrian firm operating in a competitive 
labour market would reduce N following either a fall in F or rise 
in P. The latter is often referred to as the "perverse supply response"
Domar, however, showed that such paradoxical behaviour disappears 
if the LMF faces a labour supply constraint which is binding. As can 
be seen from figure 2.2 an upward shift in the y-schedule following 
a reduction in F or increase in P enables the LMF to operate 
further up the labour supply schedule thus achieving a higher level 
of both income and employment.
Conversely a rise in F or fall in P might be expected to 
result in a fall in N as some workers leave for more desirable 
opportunities outside the firm. However, by leaving these workers 
cause a further reduction in the incomes of remaining members. Meade 
(1972) argues that if the fixed costs had been willingly incurred 
by all the members it is not a true participatory cooperative if any 
individual member can without any obligation just walk out and leave the 
remainder with the full debt burden. We shall return to this point
below.
23
If the labour supply constraint is not binding we suggested 
above that the LMF will simply operate at the maximum of the y schedule. 
In this case, then, the comparative static response of an Illyrian 
firm will be identical to the traditional analysis with a competitive 
labour market. An interesting consequence of monopsony, however, is 
that the movement to a new level of N may involve workers joining 
and workers leaving the firm at the same time. Consider for example 
a fall in price. This causes an expansion in membership, but since 
income per member falls it is possible that some of the initial 
members will leave. As noted earlier, individuals are located along 
the labour supply schedule according to their reservation income 
level. If the price fall causes incomes inside the LMF to drop below 
the reservation income of any of the initial members then they would 
leave and be replaced by workers further down the labour supply 
schedule.
A major focus of recent criticism of the Illyrian model concerns 
the prediction that a rise in P causes a fall in N. A number of 
authors have pointed out that what is being maximised here is the 
incomes of those that remain with no account taken of the fate of 
dismissed workers. Steinherr and Thisse (1979) suggest that for a 
membership reduction to be fair to all members one of two procedures 
must be followed. Either those who leave be fully compensated by 
remaining members such that any worker is indifferent between staying 
and leaving, or a vote is taken on the optimum membership size and the 
process of selection is random with everyone having an equal chance 
of being selected. Models incorporating such rules have recently been 
proposed. In all cases it is assumed that the supply curve of labour 
is horizontal. After a brief discussion of the existing analysis we 
shall examine the implications of replacing this assumption with one
24
of monopsony
Following Ireland and Law (1978, 1982) we shall consider a
compensation scheme which is ex post egalitarian in that after the
( 2)payment of transfers each worker receives the same income.
Let Ng be the equilibrium membership at an initial price Pq .
If price now changes to the compensation rule requires the replacement 
of (2.4) with
V
' PXQ - F
N
PjQ -  F
N
N
(NQ - N) .C
N
N < N„
(2.6a)
(2.6b)
C, the amount of compensation, is given by
C - V - A (2.7)
where A is the income available to workers who leave the LMF and 
is assumed to equal the income received at the initial price Pq .
The scheme has no effect in situations where membership would 
otherwise be increased so (2.6a) is identical to (2.4). However,
(2.6b) is different because if employment is reduced the NQ - N 
workers who leave must be compensated by an amount C. It is perhaps 
useful here to draw a distinction between membership and employment.
In the Ireland and Law scheme the number employed within the enterprise 
may be reduced but all Nq remain members in the sense that they are 
entitled to equal incomes. Although rigid downwards membership would 
be increased if it raised income per worker, Bonin (1984) makes the 
same distinction but in his model membership is assumed rigid in both 
directions.
I
25
Ireland and Law (1982 p.22) demonstrate that compensation has
the effect of replacing a perverse employment response to a price
. . . . .  . (3)increase with rigidity - V is maximised by remaining at N^.
Intuitively this is easily understood if we use (2.7) to simplify (2.6b)
to
PlQ + (NQ - N) A - F N < ( 2 . 8)
It can be seen that income per member depends upon the contributions 
of both those who remain in the firm, (P^Q), and those who leave 
(Nq - N)A . Figure 2.3 reveals that the marginal worker contributes 
more by remaining in the firm than by leaving to earn A.
Figure 2.3
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A second possibility is to require that each member has the 
same chance of being selected for dismissal. For simplicity, assume 
that individuals, in voting on the optimum membership level, aim to 
maximise expected income, Z:
PXQ - F
N 5 N„
(Pxq - F). N + (N0 - N). A N < N0 •
(2.9a)
(2.9b)
Since 2.9 can be rearranged to produce 2.6, this yields the same N as 
the compensation scheme. That is, if Nq maximises y at price and
this maximum value of y equals A, then an increase in price will not 
affect membership.
So, by introducing compensation or voting with random selection
the "perverse" membership response to a rise in price (or fall in fixed
. . . . . (4)costs) is removed. Instead, the membership level remains rigid. A
further development of these models is to consider the LMF response
in situations other than simply a rise in price or fall in fixed costs.
Brewer and Browning (1982) show that in certain circumstances the
membership level might be reduced even with compensation or voting
schemes. For example an increase in both price and A could make
it optimal to reduce membership from Nq to a lower level satisfying
= A and maximising (2.9).
Let us now introduce an upward-sloping labour supply schedule into 
the analysis. As noted above, each point on the schedule relates to 
a specific individual and shows the minimum income level at which they 
are prepared to work in the LMF. Equivalently, we can think of it as 
depicting the alternative income level. A, that they would receive were
. w  ' '•* ■ • "W • ' ^
27
they Co leave Che firm. Thus, whereas in previous analyses each 
deparCing member is assumed Co receive Che same alcernacive income, 
wich monopsony Chere is a differenc for each worker, corresponding
co cheir posicion on Che supply schedule.
Consider firsc Che prediccion chac wich compensacion or expecCed 
income maximisacion a LMF will noC alcer ics membership in response Co 
a rise in P or fall in F. This resulc assumed ChaC Che oucside 
income available Co all workers, A, equalled Che inicial level of LMF 
income, y^. Wich Che inCroduccion of an upward-sloping labour supply
curve Che maximum value of A. muse bel y^ and for all ocher
members < y^. Thus Che prediccion chac membership will noC be reduced 
remains unalcered.
The consequences of monopsony become more incerescing, however, 
if we move away from Che simple comparacive scacic response co a rise 
in P or fall in F. Suppose inscead chac we wish Co examine che 
behaviour of a firm which, in figure 2.4 has an inicial membership,
Nq , and income, y , somewhere along Che segmenc a -*• b of Che 
y schedule.
Figure 2.4
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Such a situation might be explained as a disequilibrium - 
perhaps it was the group of size NQ who got together and decided 
to form the co-operative. Alternatively, as with Brewer and Browning 
(1982), there may have been a previous Illyrian equilibrium at different 
values of both P and F. If this equilibrium had been below a -*■ b 
the change in parameters would cause the Nq members’ incomes to rise 
to y^. However, if it had been above a b there may have been 
some workers with values of exceeding the income per member
associated with the new y schedule. In this case our starting point 
(N0 , y ) might have been preceded by some voluntary quitting.
Consider, for simplicity, an initial combination, N^, y^ , 
at point "b" in figure 2.4.^^ Would the firm reduce membership 
towards the Illyrian level, N , if departing members had to be 
compensated? As each member would receive a different outside income 
the compensation paid would also need to vary across individuals if 
the post compensation earnings are to equate. If such a scheme were 
possible, then membership would be reduced up to the point where:
g(N) - . (2.10)
Thus in figure 2.4 membership falls from Nq to . This is because 
the initial membership will, as a group, gain by a membership reduction
if the income that could be earned outside by the marginal worker
. . . (6)exceeds his or her contribution to the revenue of the LMF.
It may not, however, be possible to discriminate among workers 
in the payment of compensation. Suppose instead that a single level of 
compensation was offered and each worker decided whether or not to leave.
29
Let C be the amount of compensation. Then the marginal 
leaver receives g(N) + C after compensation. Define V~ to be the 
income per remaining member after compensation has been paid. That is:
y(N) - C .
( N0 - N '
(2.11)
Since this must equal the income of the marginal leaver we have:
N. N
V. = y (N) - C g(N) + C ( 2 . 12)
y(N)
N0 - N g(N) (2.13)
Maximisation with respect to N yields the first-order condition:
g(N) - N0 - N . gN = ^ (2.14)
Comparison of (2.14) and (2.10) reveals that the membership reduction 
will be lower in the single compensation level case than if individual 
compensation is possible. Intuitively this is because in the former 
case all of the leavers, except the marginal one, are being over­
compensated in that they receive more than is required to make them 
leave. Thus it costs the remaining LMF members more in compensation 
for any given membership reduction.
The second suggested scheme is that no compensation is paid but 
workers vote on the optimum membership size in the knowledge that they 
have an equal chance of being selected in any dismissals. As before, 
we assume that individuals aim to maximise expected income. For
M '■ M M
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individual i this is given by:
f P1Q ~ F
I — -----N
Zi “ \
(P1Q - F) N + (N0 - N) .A
N »0 »0
Maximisation of (2.15b) with respect to N gives the first-order 
condition:
A. - ^  • (2.16)
Thus individuals vote for different optimum membership levels. This 
contrasts with the previous literature in which everyone votes 
identically. With monopsony the pattern of voting depends upon the 
shape of the labour-supply schedule. If decisions are taken by majority 
vote then the outcome depends on the membership level desired by the 
median voter. It is clear from figure 2.4 that employment may be 
reduced from but not to the Illyrian equilibrium. Also, there is
clearly no reason to expect the same reduction as in either of the 
compensation models.^
Thus far we have discussed situations in which, in the absence 
of compensation, remaining members would benefit from the dismissal 
of others. A further interesting situation is where some workers 
desire to leave but this makes the remainder worse off. As noted 
earlier, this arises following a price fall or rise in fixed costs 
when the labour supply constraint is binding (figure 2.1). Meade (1972) 
argued that in a true participatory co-operative, members would not be able
N 5 50 (2.15a)
N < NQ . (2.15b)
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to leave without obligation; instead they may have to compensate 
those who remain. If the amount of compensation required from workers 
could be set individually, and both stayers and leavers end up with 
the same net income then, as before, membership will be reduced as 
long as g(N) > R^. It can be shown that membership would not now 
fall in response to a rise in F and may, or may not, do so following a 
fall in P. Once again, any contraction in emolovnient would be less 
if a single level of compensation was set.
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2.4 CONCLUSIONS
The most important results in this chapter concern the 
implications of monopsony power in the labour market for comparisons 
between an Illyrian LMF and a profit-maximising CF operating in the 
same markets with the same technology. It was demonstrated that, under 
conditions in which the CF earns positive profits, income per worker 
in the LMF will exceed the wage rate paid in a CF. The same result 
obtains if the firms operate in a perfectly competitive labour market 
but have monopoly power in the product market. However, whereas 
in the latter case the CF employs more workers than the LMF we have 
shown that with monopsony power the LMF might employ more. Imperfections 
in the labour market, in the form of monopsony power, therefore have 
important consequences for the welfare levels associated with the two 
enterprise types.
A limitation of the comparisons between LMF and CF is 
the assumption of identical production functions. However, it is not 
the intention here to enter the debate over the relative efficiency 
of LMFs and CFs. Rather, we have shown that, whatever efficiency 
differences there might be, any comparative analysis of the two modes 
of production must take account of the degree of competition in the 
labour market.
The second half of the chanter examined short-run membership 
adjustment by LMFs. As noted by Domar (1966), an upward-sloping 
labour supply schedule which prevents the attainment of the peak of 
the income per member schedule will reverse the direction of response 
of membership to a price rise or fall in fixed costs, compared with
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the usual Illyrian analysis. If the labour supply constraint is not 
binding we suggested that the Illyrian firm behaves in the traditional 
way. However, dissatisfaction with the 'perverse' membership response 
has recently led to the introduction of models which incorporate either 
compensation, or voting combined with random selection for dismissal. 
Assuming a horizontal labour supply curve these models predict that 
the LMF will not adjust membership following a price rise or fall in 
fixed costs from a previous Illyrian equilibrium. Brewer and Browning 
(1982) show, however, that with particular initial conditions a LMF 
which has voting or compensation schemes may engage in some membership 
reduction. It was shown in section 2.3 that upward-sloping labour 
supply schedules did not alter the prediction of no response to a 
price rise or fixed cost fall. However, in the type of situation 
examined by Brewer and Browning monopsony did lead to interesting 
consequences. Thus, for example, schemes which would produce identical 
results under perfect competition no longer do so under monopsony.
Under the compensation scheme it became necessary to distinguish 
between cases where compensation could be set individually and where 
there was just a single rate. The likelihood and extent of a member­
ship reduction will be lower in the latter. Secondly, there was now 
no reason to expect the voting procedure to yield the same outcome as 
the compensation scheme (in either form).
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
1. See Thomas and Logan (1982) p.43.
2. In contrast, remaining workers do worse than leavers in the 
Steinherr and Thisse scheme. See Ireland and Law (1982 p.22) 
for a comparison of the two procedures.
3. Similarly a reduction in F would not lead to a fall in N.
4. A membership reduction remains a possibility in the event of 
a price fall if initial membership is not at the Illyrian 
optimum. See Ch.5 note 15.
5. An equilibrium at "b" would occur if the LMF allowed anyone
who wished to join the firm to do so. Such a model has been 
suggested by Pauly and Redisch (1973) in the context of U.S. 
non-profit hospitals. Our analysis could then be interpreted 
as an examination of what happens if such a firm decided to 
maximise the particular utilitarian objective function given 
by (2.13).
6 . If the initial position was to the left of "b" the analysis
would not be so simple because the supply of workers would 
exceed the LMF membership, and hence a priori, the A.'s of 
workers inside the firm would not be known. Without this 
information membership adjustment is indeterminate over a range. 
Thus if the starting point was between a' and b there would 
be a reduction in membership at least to N^ and possibly 
beyond. From an initial position between a and a' there 
may or may not be a membership reduction. Membership will 
never of course fall below the Illyrian equilibrium, N.
7. It is interesting to note that if membership is reduced
following a vote, a subsequent vote could produce a further 
contraction. This could happen if, by chance, it was 
predominantly those workers with low A.'s who were selected 
for dismissal in the initial reduction^
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CHAPTER 3
OLIGOPSONY AND ENTRY IN THE LABOUR MARKET
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter monopsony power in the labour market 
was seen to have interesting implications for LMF behaviour and performance, 
and for comparisons with CFs. We now extend the analysis beyond the 
case of a single monopsonist. The following section is concerned with 
a group of CF oligopsonists and derives a relationship between wage 
rates on the one hand and market structure and firm conduct on the 
other. Section 3.3 then contrasts this situation with a LMF duopsony 
and also examines a mixed duopsony comprising one CF and one LMF.
The focus then shifts to the entry process, with section 3.4 analysing 
the response of both CF and LMF incumbents to the threat of potential 
entry, in each case comparing CF and LMF potential entry.
As in chapter 2, we assume that all firms have identical 
fixed costs, production functions and revenue functions. To concentrate 
attention on the labour market we also assume, except for an 
extension in the appendix, that there are no product market inter­
actions between the firms.
• *........  rm> ' ‘y" ' ■’ •" — ***. *
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3.2 CAPITALIST FIRM OLIGOPSONY
In the previous chapter we saw that a profit-maximising 
monopsonist would pay a wage below the marginal revenue product of 
labour, the extent of the shortfall being determined by the labour 
supply schedule as follows:
where is the elasticity of labour supply:
dN W 
dW N
Whilst this monopsony result is well-known there has been no 
theoretical analysis of wage-productivity margins under oligopsonistic 
conditions. In this section we formulate a model of oligopsony by 
adapting the Cowling and Waterson (1976) analysis of structure, 
conduct and performance in oligopoly.
Consider a labour market in which S firms demand the homogeneous 
labour input, N. Firm i aims to
max 7t . 
N. 1
R.(N.) - WN. - F. i l  l i
where the market wage rate, W, is given by
Remembering that there are assumed to be no product market 
interactions, the first-order conditions for a maximum are
dN dNt
or s -i dWW + N. —  (1 + 6.) 1 dN L 0» (i“lf••« *S) (3.6)
where dN
dN.i
1 +
d E N.
i*i J
dN.L
1 + 6 .l (3.7)
As our interest is in different organisational forms it seems 
sensible at this stage to assume that the CFs have identical production 
f u n c t i o n s a n d  conjectures, 6^. Equation (3.7) then becomes
N dWp _ w + -  — (1 + 6) = 0
S dN
(3.8)
which can be rewritten as
^  - «
w
1 + 6 
Si
(3.9)
Thus in the case of identical firms the proportionate excess 
of the marginal revenue product over the wage rate is related inversely 
to the number of firms, S, and the market elasticity of labour supply, i, 
and directly to the conjectural variation term, 6. Note that if S = 1
then 6 ■ 0 and so we obtain the familiar monopsony result (3.1) (2)
The conjectural variation term depends both on the number of 
rivals and each firm's expectations about the response of rivals to 
its own employment decision. This latter element can be interpreted 
as the degree of apparent collusion. If each firm expects its rivals 
to fully match any adjustment to its own employment level then 
dN.
dN.L
1, Vj • i, and so we would obtain the joint profit-maximising
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N 1solution ------  = —  . This would be interpreted as perfect
W $
(apparent) collusion. At the other extreme, the competitive outcome 
is generated by o = -1.
Employers may collude formally but, paradoxically, high values
of ^ j  may also result from rivalry between firms. This coexistence
dN.i
of rivalry and collusion has been discussed by Cowling (1982) in 
relation to product markets. Its basis is that the closer the rivalry 
the more immediate will be the response to any attempt to secure an 
advantage. This in turn makes a breakaway movement unprofitable and 
hence serves to maintain collusion. In terms of our model, then, 
close rivalry leads firms to expect that any attempt to reduce their 
employment level would immediately be followed by other firms (that 
is, a high value of 6 for given S). It may further be argued 
that the degree of apparent collusion is likely to increase with
concentration since any attempt to secure an advantage by one firm
(3)will more easily be detected when the number of firms is small.
This analysis of collusion therefore suggests that the value of 6 
will fall less than in proportion to a reduction in S and hence is 
further reason for believing that the wage-productivity margin will 
rise as the number of firms falls.
One final point to note briefly is that collusion need not 
relate only to levels of employment (and thus wage levels). Another 
possibility is that firms may collude to restrict the choice of firms 
available to workers. This is, for example, the purpose of the 
"reserve clause" in professional baseball which is referred to in the
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appendix below. Similarly a study by Lester (1955) of manufacturing 
firms in New Jersey revealed the existence of an agreement between 
firms not to attract workers from each other. This type of collusion 
cannot be captured in our model since its effect is to make the number 
of alternatives facing a worker already employed differ from the number
facing a worker outside.
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3.3. LABOUR-MANAGED AND MIXED DUOPSONY
In this section LMFs are introduced into the analysis. First 
of all we examine a duopsony comprising a pair of identical LMFs 
and then the mixed case with one LMF and one CF is considered.
As in the monopsony discussion of chapter 2 we need to 
distinguish between situations when the labour supply constraint is 
binding and when it is not. One possible equilibrium for a pair of
LMFs is where both are able to attain the maximum point on their
. . . .  * income per member schedules. Denoting this income level y. and
. *the associated employment level , the requirement for this
. . . . .  * * * unconstrained equilibrium is y ? g(N^ + . Or, equivalently, the
total labour supply forthcoming at y , N(y*), must be at least as
* * . . . great as + N2 . Figure 3.1 depicts such a situation.
Figure 3.1
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Comparisons between this equilibrium and that generated by 
a CF duopsony are as we would expect from the analysis of monopsony 
- income per member will exceed the wage rate but employment in the 
LMFs could be more or less than in the CFs. In the previous section 
we saw that the actual value of the wage rate (and hence also employment) 
may vary systematically with labour market structure and firm conduct.
An important distinguishing characteristic of the LMF duopsony is 
that there is no such relationship involving income and employment.
Simply by inspecting Figure 3.1 we can see, firstly, that 
labour supply conditions can change without having any effect on the 
two enterprises and, secondly, there need be no interaction between 
the firms - either could alter its own membership without necessarily 
having any impact on the other.
A second type of equilibrium is one in which one of the firms 
* *attains (y^, N^) but the other faces a binding labour supply constraint.
. . . .  . *Thus in Figure 3.2, firm 1 is not constrained and comprises members
*each earning y^.
The equilibrium of the second firm will depend upon which of 
the individuals arrayed along segment a ■» b of the labour supply 
schedule happen to be in firm 1. The best that firm 2 could hope for 
is that all of c -► b are members of firm 1, in which case it can
•k -ffattract N, » N(y^) - workers and each would earn V 2 * In
other cases, such as where members of firm 1 are a random selection of 
all individuals along a -*■ b, both membership and income per member in 
firm 2 would be smaller.
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Figure 3.2
An obvious and important difference between this and both the 
CF and unconstrained LMF equilibria is that here an income differential 
exists between the workers in the two enterprises. It is interesting 
to note that this equilibrium is inefficient because marginal revenue 
products are not equated across the two firms. If transfer payments 
were feasible then a reallocation of workers between the firms would 
yield a Pareto improvement. It is well known that this type of inefficiency 
can occur in the absence of a labour supply constraint if the enter­
prises differ with respect to fixed costs, technology or the revenue 
function. Figure 3.3 illustrates this point.
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Figure 3.3
In our duopsony equilibrium, on the other hand, the firms are identical 
in all of these respects. They only differ in income and employment 
because, perhaps by chance, one firm attained (y^ N^) before the
other was able to.
The final possible equilibrium involves both of the LMFs 
being constrained by the labour supply schedule. Unless some restriction 
is imposed upon members who wish to leave, one of the firms in this 
equilibrium will consist of just a single member. To see this, 
suppose initially that both firms have at least two workers and that
it itneither has attained (y N ). In this situation an individual worker 
could raise his or her income by moving from one enterprise to the other.
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If employment levels were equal to begin with then the initial direction 
of movement is arbitrary, but thereafter it will be the larger enterprise 
which grows at the expense of the smaller one. Provided the labour 
supply constraint continues to bind on the larger firm the exodus will 
continue to the point where a single member remains. This individual 
now carries the full fixed debt burden. Given the assumption of a 
declining marginal revenue product of labour (s)he will be better off 
in the short-run as a one-person enterprise than moving to the larger 
firm.
As noted in the previous chapter, Meade (1972) suggests that 
it may be considered unfair for members to leave if, as a result, those 
who remain become worse off because all members voluntarily took on 
the fixed debt burden in the first place. The LMF may therefore 
devise rules which prevent this happening. One obvious possibility 
would be the egalitarian compensation scheme discussed in chapter 2.
This would require a departing member to compensate those who remain such
that all end up with identical post-compensation incomes. As we saw
in the previous discussion membership would only contract if an individual 
contributes more to the total receipts of the original membership by 
departing to work elsewhere than if (s)he remained in the firm. The 
contribution made by remaining in the firm is the marginal revenue 
product. Since this must exceed the income per member in the other
firm there will be no contraction of membership. With the compensation
scheme, then, we can have an equilibrium with two constrained LMFs, 
both of which contain two or more members.
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Turning now to consider a mixed duposony of one LMF and one CF, 
one possible equilibrium is where the LMF operates at the maximum of
its income per member schedule and there is an excess supply of labour
. . . . * at this income level. Thus in Figure 3.4 the LMF has N members
each receiving y* and the supply of labour is N(y*) > N*.
Figure 3.4
The CF equilibrium depends on the residual labour supply and 
this in turn depends on which of the N(y*) workers happen to be 
in the LMF. Figure 3.4 illustrates the situation where, by chance, it 
is those individuals located along a -*■ b who comprise the LMF 
membership. The CF then faces the residual labour supply function 
g(N)' and an associated marginal factor outlay schedule MFO' and 
hence will employ Nc workers at a wage of Wq . In this particular
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example the LMF is the larger of the two firms. However, if the N 
members had come from points further up the supply schedule the CF 
would employ more than Nc workers and it could be the bigger of the 
firms in equilibrium.
Finally, there may be a mixed equilibrium in which the LMF 
operates below the maximum of the y-schedule. Clearly there cannot be 
such an equilibrium if y i W because an individual will have an incentive
•kto move from the CF to the LMF. Moreover, if y > W > y a coalition of 
workers of sufficient size would be able to increase their earnings by
switching to the LMF. It would be in the interests of the LMF to encourage
• • • * . . such a coalition by announcing the prospect of y . It is interesting
to note that conjectures about possible CF responses are irrelevant
here because the workers must actually transfer to raise their incomes.
(This is discussed further in the following section). Thus the only
, . . . . .  k kpossible mixed equilibrium in which the LMF operates below (y N ) is
. . *one in which the CF sets W = y . However, the CF would then only earn
zero profits at best and hence it may well prefer the equilibrium
. • . * * discussed above in which the LMF operates at (y N ) and it accepts the
residual labour supply schedule.
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3.4. ENTRY
Our analysis of monopsonistic and oligopolistic labour markets 
has neglected the possible implications of entry and potential entry.
In the CF literature very little attention has been paid to entry into 
labour, as opposed to product markets. Indeed it seems that, apart 
from a footnote in Modigliani's (1958) examination of scale economies 
as a barrier to entry, the only paper to focus on this issue is 
Williamson (1968). Williamson showed that where a trade-union was 
able to enforce a common wage rate across the industry an established 
firm may make use of this by agreeing a wage which would deter entry.
Our starting point is the observation that an existing firm can also 
influence wage rates if there exists an upward-sloping labour supply 
schedule.
For us an obvious question to consider is whether the situation 
facing an incumbent CF will differ depending upon whether the potential 
entrant is a CF or LMF. The same question will also be asked when 
the established firm is labour-managed. We assume, as before, that 
firms have identical technologies and fixed costs.
Fixed costs play an important role in the CF literature on 
product market entry because they preclude entry at a negligibly small 
scale. The crucial difference between "small-scale" and "large-scale" 
entry, to use Scherer's (1980) terminology, is that in the latter entry 
will have an impact on the incumbent firm(s) and hence potential 
entrants must take account of possible reactions. Much of the literature 
is devoted to ways of modelling this interplay. Since it is not our 
intention to focus on this issue throughout the remainder of the thesis
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we shall adapt to the analysis of the labour market the simplest and 
most well-known assumption concerning incumbent reactions - the Sylos 
Postulate. According to the Sylos Postulate the potential entrant 
believes that the incumbent firm will maintain its pre-entry level 
of output in the event of entry, and the incumbent knows that this is 
the expectation. We shall assume that this holds with respect to the 
employment level, although of course in our one - variable - input 
model it makes no difference whether employment or output is used.
This simple approach will suffice to illustrate, firstly, that there 
are important differences between the two organisational forms with 
regard to labour market entry and, secondly, that there is an interesting 
contrast between product and labour market entry where the LMF is 
concerned.
We begin with the situation where the incumbent firm is labour- 
managed. This is easily dealt with because potential entry is irrelevant 
- if the LMF is constrained by the labour supply schedule then entry is 
not possible and if it is unconstrained then entry will have no 
effect on it.
More detailed analysis is required when the established firm 
is capitalist. In figure 3.5 we consider potential entry by another CF.
Suppose the incumbent CF chose the short-run profit-maximising 
wage-employment combination (Wq Nq ) . The potential entrant would, 
under the Sylos postulate, perceive a residual supply schedule g(N)' 
facing it. There is a range of employment levels for which the y-schedule 
lies above the labour supply schedule and, remembering that it - (y-w)N,
N0 NX
Figure 3.5
entry will therefore take place. In order to deter entry the 
established firm must expand employment to since the residual 
supply schedule, g(N)", is then nowhere below the y-schedule. The 
wage rate associated with this entry deterring employment level may 
be termed the "limit wage". In figure 3.5 the limit wage is W^.
We now turn to potential entry by a LMF rather than a CF. 
Workers will be attracted to a LMF provided the income available 
exceeds their "reservation income" depicted by their position on the 
labour supply schedule. Since for any initial wage offered by the CF 
below W^ there will be a membership level for which the residual 
labour supply schedule lies below the income per member schedule.
N0 N1
Figure 3.5
entry will therefore take place. In order to deter entry the 
established firm must expand employment to since the residual 
supply schedule, g(N)", is then nowhere below the y-schedule. The 
wage rate associated with this entry deterring employment level may 
be termed the "limit wage". In figure 3.5 the limit wage is .
We now turn to potential entry by a LMF rather than a CF. 
Workers will be attracted to a LMF provided the income available 
exceeds their "reservation income" depicted by their position on the 
labour supply schedule. Since for any initial wage offered by the CF 
below W^ there will be a membership level for which the residual 
labour supply schedule lies below the income per member schedule.
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entry will occur. Thus wage rates below will attract either a
CF or LMF into the market. The question we now ask is whether 
remains the limit wage when faced with potential entry by a LMF.
Consider first a group of one or more workers not employed 
in the CF who are contemplating establishing a LMF. In figure 3.6 
these individuals are located to the right of point b on the labour 
supply function.
Figure 3.6
According to the Sylos Postulate they recognise that the CF 
will retain a workforce of size , if necessary by raising the wage 
rate to match the income available in the LMF. The potential membership 
of the LMF therefore consists of the individuals located to the right of b.
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This residual labour supply function can be depicted by g(N)" and 
at no point lies above the y-schedule. The closest to a viable LMF 
is one of size N comprising the individuals between b and c.
However, the income that would be obtained, y, is just insufficient 
to attract the marginal individual located at point c.^^
Now suppose instead that among the coalition considering the 
establishment of a LMF there is at least one individual presently 
working for the CF. A possibility now is that there could be a 
coalition of size N which consists of only individuals to the left 
of point c. If they formed a LMF each would earn y. This would 
also be the wage rate paid by the CF to maintain a workforce of size 
N^, so, ex post, the coalition members from the CF are no better off 
in the LMF than remaining CF workers. However, they are better off 
than previously and the only way to achieve y is to form a LMF.
Hence entry will take place and thus is no longer a limit wage.
What underlies this result is an asymmetry between those involved 
in the coalition and those outside. The former realise that earnings 
can only rise through membership of the LMF whereas the latter only 
see the ex post situation in which W - y and hence remain in the CF.
The crucial difference between entry by CF and LMF becomes clear 
when we contrast the above finding with that of Miyamoto (1980). 
Miyamoto examined product market entry under the Sylos Postulate and 
found that the same limit price applies whether the entrant is 
capitalist or tabour-managed. The difference between our results 
arises because in the labour market case the effect of entry is to 
raise the wage rate whilst in the product market the consequence is 
a price fall. The fundamental distinction is that a fall in price 
would reduce revenue for both types of firm whereas a rise in the wage 
rate is a cost only to the CF.
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3.5. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter examined oligopsonistic interactions in the labour 
market. First of all we considered a market consisting only of CFs 
and suggested a model which related the wage rate, or more accurately 
the wage-productivity margin, to the number of firms, the degree of 
apparent collusion and the elasticity of labour supply. The following 
section then used a duopsony model to demonstrate that such a systematic 
relationship would not exist if the market was populated by LMFs 
rather than CFs. A further interesting feature of LMF duopsony is 
that income per member may differ between the two firms even although 
they have identical fixed costs, production functions and revenue 
functions. In turn this could mean that members of the smaller 
enterprise receive a lower income than if they had been employees 
in a CF duopsony. This contrasts with the monopsony case in the 
previous chapter where LMF members always earn more. An examination 
of a mixed duopsony comprising one CF and one LMF again revealed no 
systematic determinants of workers' earnings. If the LMF was able 
to operate at the top of its income per member schedule then its 
members would earn more than workers in the CF. However, there is 
also the possibility of an equilibrium in which the LMF is operating 
below its optimum and in which the CF employees do better. Finally, 
section 3.4 analysed the process of entry using the Sylos Postulate.
This simple treatment suggested that a strategy used by an incumbent CF 
to successfully deter entry by another CF may not necessarily prevent 
entry by a LMF. The underlying rationale is that an increase in the 
wage rate following entry represents a cost to a CF entrant but not
to a LMF.
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EXTENSIONS TO THE CF DUOPSONY MODEL AND SOME NOTES ON THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
Studies which have attempted to measure the impact of CF 
monopsony power on wages may be divided into two groups according to 
their methodology. The first approach involves attempting to estimate 
a worker's marginal revenue product. This is then compared with the 
wage paid and the proportional difference is sometimes referred to as 
the rate of monopsonistic exploitation. Using this procedure,
Scully (1974) concluded that the monopsony power conveyed by the 
"reserve clause" in U.S. professional baseball players' contracts 
resulted in considerable exploitation of players. The second approach, 
which is the focus of our analysis, is to include an employer concentration 
term in cross section wage equations. This approach has been used, 
for example, by Landon (1970) to study the wages of newspaper workers, 
Landon and Baird (1971) for teachers, and Link and Landon (1975) for 
nurses. (All using U.S. data.) In each case the results suggest 
that increases in concentration are associated with lower wages.
However, in none of the studies was the estimating equation relating 
wages and market structure variables the outcome of an explicit 
theoretical model. It is simply asserted that since a monopsonist 
will pay a wage below the competitive level then increases in the 
degree of employer concentration will lead to lower wages. The model 
presented in section 3.2 and extended below generates a relationship 
between concentration and wage rates and hence may provide a useful 
theoretical framework for empirical analysis.
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Non-Identical Firms
In order to derive the expression (3.9), it was assumed that
firms were identical in both their production functions and conjectures. 
We can now examine the effect of relaxing this assumption.
Multiplying each term in (3.6) by and summing over the S
firms yields
variation terms.
Comparing (A3.2) with the expression for identical firms (3.9), 
we see that the left-hand side is now the proportionate excess of a 
weighted average of marginal revenue products over the wage rate. 
Similarly on the right-hand side the conjectural variation terms are 
weighted according to firm size. The model suggests the Herfindahl as 
the appropriate measure of concentration in explaining market outcome.
If the marginal product of labour is constant then the left-hand
(A3.1)
or
Z N iRN- - WN G(l+u)
<P
(A3.2)
WN
where G = Z*  —  is the Herfindahl index of concentration in the
In .
labour market and u ~ is a weighted average of conjectural
side of (A3.2) is the share of wages in total revenue. It is therefore 
interesting to relate this to the finding of Cowling and Molho (1982) 
that, for the U.K., higher degrees of product market concentration
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are associated with lower wage shares. Their estimating equation is 
based upon Cowling's (1981) oligopoly model in which marginal costs 
are assumed constant. Such an assumption would imply a horizontal 
labour supply curve. Our analysis has shown that with an upward 
sloping labour supply schedule wage shares will vary inversely with 
concentration in the labour market. Thus, if there is an overlap 
between product and labour markets, the Cowling and Molho results may 
reflect market power in the labour market rather than product market. 
This discussion suggests that, ideally, both product and labour market 
conditions should be incorporated into the analysis. In the following 
section, therefore, oligopoly in the product market is incorporated into 
our model.
Oligopsony with Oligopoly
This section incorporates product market power into the model.
For simplicity it will be assumed that the product and labour markets 
coincide exactly (that is, it is the same firms in each) and the 
analysis will be restricted to identical firms. This will serve to 
illustrate the general form of the result; relaxing either restriction 
would introduce substantial complications.
Each aims to
Max ir. « PQ.(N.) - WN. - F. (A3.3)„ i 1 i 1N .1
where P is the market price given by
P - P(Q) > P(QX + Q2 + ... + Qg) . (A3.4)
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As before, the wage rate is determined by W * g(N^ + ^  + ... + N^) 
The first-order conditions for a maximum are
dir. __l
dN.
1
PdQi + Qi dP dg_
L dN.l dQ dN.
W + N. dW . dNl -- --
dN dN.
0, (i«l,...,s)
(A3.5)
where
dQ « 1 + z
dQ j dN j
dN.i dN.l dN.J dN.l
(A3.6)
dQ. dQ.
Given identical firms, — - - — 1 , V. so we can write
dN. dN. Ji J
dQ - dQi (1+6) .
dN. dN.l l
Substituting (3.7) and (A3.7) into (A3.5) gives
(A3.7)
p + Qi dP * i  (1+6) W + N L dW (1+6)
dN£ dQ dN.^ dN
(A3.8)
Therefore
p
dN.
1 + 1+6 - W
— —
1 + 1+5
Nn N0
(A3.9)
where n » dQ . P
w 1+5
Nn
1 +
Comparing (A3.10) with (3.9) it can be seen that the effect of 
incorporating product market power into the analysis is to introduce 
terms involving the market elasticity of demand, n, into the right 
hand side. It is easily verified that as n ■+ " (product market 
power tends to zero) then (A3.10) -+ (3.9). As we would expect, the 
presence of product market power increases the size of the right hand 
side term and hence increases the proportionate excess of P.
dN.l
over the wage rate.
A problem for empirical work is that both <t and 5 will 
typically be non-observable. However, since the value of 0 depends 
on the availability of substitutes some of the effect may be captured 
in cross section analysis by the ratio of vacancies to unemployment 
and the average level of wages in the region. The latter proved to 
be a significant variable in the studies by Landon (1970) and Link 
and Landon (1975) referred to earlier. The apparent collusion term, 
it was suggested above, may very inversely with the number of firms
in the market.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1. It is not necessary that the goods be physically identical,
as long as they sell for the same price and are produced under 
identical conditions.
2. In the appendix to this chapter we extend the model to non­
identical firms and to the coexistence of oligopsony in the labour 
market and oligopoly in the product market. Also, it is pointed 
out that our analysis may provide a useful theoretical framework 
for empirical analyses of labour market buyer power which to date 
have not been based upon an explicit theoretical model.
3. See for example Stigler (1964). Stigler's model relates to the 
product market with price as the decision variable, but the same 
idea could be applied to quantity setting in the labour market.
4. If the firms are initially of equal size then MRP^ = MRP2  
and, because of the labour supply constraint, MRP > y.
If firm 1 is smaller then MRP^ > MRP,, > y^ .
5. Note that point C represents a total labour supply equal to 
the sum of the two employment levels, N1 + N.
dQi
6. With a downward-sloping demand curve for the product, P ---
dN.
1
is no longer the marginal revenue product of labour.
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CHAPTER 4
COURNOT-STACKELBERG MODELS OF PRODUCT MARKET DUOPOLY 
(Joint work with Peter J. Law)
4.1 INTRODUCTION
One of the most interesting research areas arising from a concern 
with LMFs operating within capitalist economies is the analysis of 
markets which comprise both capitalist and labour-managed enterprises. 
In the previous chapter we looked briefly at a labour market duopsony 
comprising one firm of each type. We now shift our attention to the 
product market and explore some aspects of interaction in a simple 
mixed duopoly.
Using the same CF and LMF models as chapters 2 and 3, and 
assuming away any labour market imperfections, the following section 
describes a mixed Cournot equilibrium and derives the responses of 
the firms to cost and demand changes. Section 4.3 then considers 
Stackelberg leadership and followership. It is well-known that, under 
fairly general conditions, profit-maximising CF Cournot duopolists 
will have negatively inclined reaction functions in output space. 
Consequently, if one firm can act as a Stackelberg leader while the 
other follows, the leader's profits will exceed those attainable by 
that firm in Cournot equilibrium. But if both CF firms try to lead, 
Stackelberg disequilibrium results. Vanek (1970) shows that under 
some circumstances LMF Cournot duopolists who seek to maximise income
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per member will have positively sloped reaction functions. In the 
case of LMF duopolists the income per member associated with one firm 
acting as a Stackelberg follower can exceed that which results from 
Stackelberg leadership and a fortiori that associated with Cournot 
equilibrium. This is demonstrated below by means of a simple example. 
If both act as followers the outcome is Cournot equilibrium.
This contrast between LMF and CF duopolists suggests the interesting 
possibility that in a mixed duopoly, composed of one LMF and one CF, 
a determinate Stackelberg equilibrium may be attained in which the 
optimal strategy is for the CF firm to lead and the LMF to follow.
Our example will generate such an equilibrium. The example we adopt 
has the virtue that it is sufficiently tractable to be easily solved 
by analytic methods.
4.2 COURNOT MODEL
Firm 1 (the Illyrian LMF) and firm 2 (the profit-maximising 
CF) produce identical products and face a downward-sloping market 
demand function.
2
P = P(Ql ♦ Q2, A) ; 3P/3Q_ < 0, 3P/ax > O . - f ^  = 0, i-1,2 (4.1)
where P is market price, is output of the ith firm and A is
a slope-preserving demand shift parameter. Labour (number of members 
or number of workers), N^, is the only variable input and each firm is 
constrained by the same production function.
Qi " f<V; 3Qi/3Ni > °- 3 Qi 3N.2l
0, 1,2 (4.2)
Revenue of firm i, R^, is thus written
Ri " Ri (N1* N2’ X); 1 " X’2 ‘ (4.3)
Both firms have the same level of fixed costs, F. The LMF maximises 
income per worker, y, by choice of the labour input, N, where
Kx (Nt, N,, A) - F J /Nx . 14.4)
The CF hires workers at a wage rate, w, and maximises profits, it, 
where
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ir =■ R2(Nlf N2, X) - wN2 - F (4.5)
dQ2 dQt
Under Che Cournot assumption that “ -rr-— = 0 and thusdQ ^ dQ^
dN0 dN.
- ■ = 0, maximisation of (4.4) and (4.5) yield the twodN^ dN2
first-order conditions:
(Nx , N2) -  y (N1# N2) -  O (4.6)
(Nx, N2) - w = 0 (4.7)
These are the reaction functions in N^, N2 space and their simultaneous 
solution (the point of intersection of the reaction functions) yields 
the Cournot equilibrium values of and N,,.
Assuming a Cournot equilibrium exists, how would the firms
respond to changes in the parame ters w, F and X? Total differentiation
of (4.6) and (4.7) yields
a dl^ + 8  dN, - ■. d - ( 1 » i ^ d x (4.8)
N1 3N1 "i 3X
Y dNt + 0dN, « dw -
ril 
O
 
n
 
I 3P dX (4.9)
3N,, 3X
3R,
3N,
3R„
3N„
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'!^)2 < o
,3NiJ
23 R 3Q, 3Q
y - --- =  — f-    < 0
3Q 3Q 3N2 3N
3R2 3Q, 3 R, 3Q- 2
9 » — --- 7“  + --- ( —  ) < 0 .
3Q2 3N“ 3Q2 3N2
Terms a and 0 are negative by diminishing marginal revenue 
productivity of labour; y is negative on the assumption that an 
increase in the output of firm 1 reduces marginal revenue in firm 2; 
and B cannot be signed in general but is positive if the demand 
function is linear and average labour productivity is falling.
To examine the comparative statics of the above system requires
knowledge of the sign of A = a0 - By. In the appendix it is shown
that assuming stability of the system ensures that A is positive.
3N.
Equations (4.8) and (4.9) can now be solved by Cramer's rule for ---
3w
3JT 31T
--- and ---  (see appendix) .
3F 3X
3Q„ 32R 3Q 3R,
3 = — - ( --- i—     - -  — - )
3N2 3Nx N x 3Q2
i.Qi  ♦
3QX 3N^ 3QX2
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Assuming 8 > 0 the following results are obtained, where a plus (minus) 
indicates an increase (decrease) in in response to a parameter
increase.
F A
Table 4.1; Comparative Statics of Mixed Cournot Duopoly
An increase in the wage rate will induce the profit maximiser to cut 
employment and output. The Illyrian firm then reacts to the consequent 
rise in market price by reducing membership in order to maximise 
income per worker - the well-known "perverse" membership response.
An increase in fixed costs causes the LMF to expand membership in 
order to spread the cost burden. The rise in output leads to a fall 
in market price and hence a contraction in the profit maximiser’s 
employment and output levels.
The response of the CF to a slope-preserving demand increase 
is as expected. The Illyrian firm again exhibits the "perverse" 
response (see appendix for demonstration), which accords with Ward's 
(1958) for an Illyrian monopolist.
•WM- 1
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The properties of the mixed Cournot duopoly can be illustrated 
using a simple example. Figure 4.1 shows the two firm's reaction 
functions when the demand curve is linear:
P = a - b (Q1 + Q2) (4.10)
and the production function has the simple form
Qi N* ; i - 1,2 . (4.11)
Objective functions (4.4) and (4.5) are now given by
[a - b (Qx + Q2)]q i - F
(4.4)
and
7T = [a - b (Qt + Q2)]Q2 - w N 2 - F . (4.5)'
The LMF's reaction function is then
Q, » — — ---  (4.12)
a - bQ2
and that of the profit maximiser is
Q, - 3 ~ bqi . (4.13)
2(b + w)
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Figure 4.1: Reaction Functions; Mixed Cournot Duopoly
2(b+w)
Point C denotes the Cournot equilibrium, which can be shown to be 
stable (see appendix). The consistency of this example with the results 
stated in Table 4.1 is easily checked by considering how the curves 
shift with a change in w, F or a (demand shift) and where the new 
equilibrium will be established.
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4 ■ 3 STACKELBERG MODELS
In the Cournot duopoly firms take the output level of the 
rival to be constant. An alternative set of assumptions about 
conjectural variation is contained in the Stackelberg model. A 
follower obeys its reaction function and selects its optimum level 
of output given the quantity decision of its rival, which it assumes 
to be a leader. A leader does not obey its reaction function but 
rather assumes the rival acts as a follower and chooses its optimal 
output given the rival's reaction function. It is a familiar result 
that profits are typically higher for a CF leader than a follower.
Thus both firms desire to be leaders but since neither of the reaction 
functions is obeyed a situation described by Fellner (1949), in his 
classic treatment of oligopoly, as "Stackelberg disequilibrium" 
emerges. We will contrast this well-known case with those of the LMF 
duopoly and mixed duopoly.
Figure 4.2 depicts reaction functions and iso-y curves for 
identical LMF duopolists, each firm having a reaction function of the 
type described in equation (4.12). It can easily be demonstrated 
that the iso-y curves are concave to the relevant axis and that income 
per worker in the firm is higher the nearer to its axis are the iso-y 
curves.
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Figure 4.2
Q2
The Cournot equilibrium, C, is found by simultaneous solution 
of the reaction functions which yields a quadratic in Q „  Only the 
smaller of the two real roots would be relevant as C' is unstable.
The effect of changes in fixed cost or demand on Cournot equilibrium 
can easily be examined in the figure but it is the issue of Stackelberg 
leadership and followership that particularly concerns us here. If 
firm 1 acts as a leader and firm 2 follows the solution is at S^.
If firm 2 leads and firm 1 follows it is at S-. It can clearly be 
seen from the diagram that both firms achieve a higher level of income 
per worker by following (dashed iso-y curves) rather than leading 
(solid iso-y curves). In this example both firms have identical
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fixed costs but this result persists even if there are substantial 
differences in fixed costs. This is demonstrated in Table 4.2 using 
a numerical example where a = 10 and b - 0.5.
Thus in contrast to the profit-maximising duopoly in which 
both firms typically prefer the leadership position, our example 
shows that in the LMF duopoly both firms prefer followership 
In this latter case we again have disequilibrium because their 
expectations are not realised, since each assumes that the other will 
act as a leader. The duopolists must revise their expectations.
The Cournot solution is achieved if each acts as a follower.
We now turn to the case of mixed duopoly and examine whether 
each firm would prefer the leadership or followership role. Relaxing 
the previous requirement of equal fixed costs presents no problem 
so (4.4)' and (4.5)' become
[a - b(Q1+Q2)]Q1 - Fx
(4.14)
f - [_a - b (Q1+Q2)]Q-> “ wN2 “ f2 (4.15)
and hence the LMF and CF reaction functions are, respectively
2F,
R1 • *1 a-bQ0
(4.16)
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a - bQ
R,: Q, - ------- • (4.17)
2 (b+w)
Equation (4.17) is of course identical to (4.13) because fixed costs 
play no role in the determination of the CFs output. The two reaction 
functions are depicted in figure 4.3. We shall assume that the 
parameters are such that y and it are positive and y ~ w in 
Cournot equilibrium.
A determinate leadership-followership equilibrium will emerge 
if leadership is more favourable than followership to one of the 
firms while followership is preferred by the other. If the CF a C s  
as a Stackelberg leader (while the LMF follows) the equilibrium would 
be at S.t in Figure 4.3. Here the profits earned by the CF, indicated
by iso-profit schedule it,  clearly exceed the profits corresponding 
to the iso-profit schedule through C (the Cournot equilibrium) and 
certainly exceed m', the profits available from followership (with
the LMF as leader). The CF will thus prefer leadership. But 
will the LMF accommodate the CF's policy by following, or will it too 
attempt to lead, resulting in Stackelberg disequilibrium?
If the LMF leads its members expect to receive y, the 
income per member associated with the isc-y schedule tangential to 
R2  at S2 . Now the y iso-y schedule intersects at point H.
If, as in the diagram, H lies to the right of the LMF will
prefer to follow than to lead (y* > y). However, if point H lies 
to the left of on R^, the LMF would attempt to lead. In the
present example we can establish that if y * 0, H does indeed 
lie to the right of and hence a determinate leadership-followership
equilibrium results.
We obtain the leadership value of Q,, by maximising (4.15), 
subject to (4.16), which yields:
Rather than attempt to solve for Q0 directly in (4.18) (and then 
evaluate at and hence y') our method is to determine the
a - 2Flb2q2
(a-bQ2)2
2(b+w)Q2 ” 0 (4.18)
Hvalue of Q, at point H, denoted Q-, . We can then substitute 
this value into the left-hand side of (4.18) to yield
3Q2 Q2 *
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Then it follows that:
S, lies to the left of H i 1
l
S9 and H coincide ^
lies to the right of H [
as 3ir
3Q2
I
=* 0
> 0
< 0
(4.19)
H S STo obtain Q  ^ , we first locate the co-ordinates of S9, (Q^ , Qj ) ,
by maximising (4.14) subject to (4.17), which yields:
4F, (b+w)
Qis - _ J -----
a(b+2w)
a
2 (b+w)
2F1b
a(b+2w)
(4.20)
hence y can be expressed in terms of the parameters F^, a, b 
and w thus:
„ (b+2w) £(b+2w)a^ -  8F1 b (b+w )J
y = -------------------------------- -------------  • (4.21)
16F 1 (b+w)2
Now, y is the value of y at H on R^; so substituting (4.16) in 
(4.14) (which defines y) and setting y » y we derive as:
a - (y+b)
b
(4.22)
Finally, substituting (4.22) in the left-hand side of (4.18) and 
using (4.21), we obtain:
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9tt 1 /{2+ » A a(b+w) B
3Q2 Q2 - Q2H 4F1b(y+b) a 2+b
(4.23)
where
A « (b+2w)a , B = 8F1(b+w)b2 . (4.24)
Equation (4.23) will be negative for all b, w, F^, a, if:
D = (A +B) - A + a(b+w)B 
A2+B
(4.25)
After some manipulation and using (4.24) the left-hand side of (4.25) 
can be rewritten as:
D ;
(A2+B)2
(A2+B)b [jBF, b(b+w) - a2(b+2w)] - a2(b+w)2B (4.26)
Thus, from (4.26) it is sufficient for D < 0 that
2a (b+2w) * 8F^ b(b+w). This last condition simply requires y - 0 
(compare (4.21)).^
We conclude that for this particular example, the fairly 
weak condition y % 0 is sufficient to yield a determinate equilibrium 
in which the LMF acts as a follower while the CF acts as a Stackelberg
leader.
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4.4 CONCLUSIONS
Writing subscripts l, f and c for leadership, followership 
and Cournot, our example has suggested the following rankings:
CF Duopoly tt ^ > tTq >
LMF Duopoly y„ > y^ > y
f 7T > TT > IT
Mixed Duopoly J c
1 yf ” y * * yc
so that in the mixed case a stable leadership-followership 
equilibrium would emerge. Three caveats are, however, in order.
First the outcome varies with the technology assumed. If, for example, 
the production function took the form = 6N^ firm l's reaction
function is a horizontal line and firm 2's is a negatively sloped line 
so that y^ > y^ = yp and it ^ * ttc > tt^ , implying that both
firms would prefer leadership. A fortiori if the LMFs reaction
12)function is also negatively sloped our results are affected.
Secondly, the analysis is limited by the assumption that the number of 
workers is the only variable input. It is well known that a number of 
Illyrian LMF results may be changed in the case of more than one variable
input. Finally, it may also be interesting to explore the implications
(3)of alternative maximands to the Illyrian assumption of y-maximisation. 
Nevertheless, our example demonstrates that "mixed duopoly" may be capable 
of yielding determinate Stackelberg equilibria where homogeneous firm 
types would not. Such a result is of some interest, at least as a first 
step in the investigation of product market interactions between labour- 
managed and capitalist firms.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4.
(a) Comparative Statics
By Cramer's rule from (4.8) and (4.9)
Y
3F NjA 9 3F NjA
3N1 _  S_ ^ 2 01------  S
3w A 9 3w A
Qi . 3Q1 3P 3Q2 [
' 3P 2p l3Qi Qi 3P } 1
3Ni _ 1_ Ni 3N1 3X 3N2j 3Q2 "l 3Q13Q2 j3N1 Nj_ 3Q2j
3X A
_ ^ 2 3P 3R0 32 3Q2)2
2-  *<xA|3N2 3X 3Q2 3N2 [mJ 3Q2 2s q2J
With function
9
a p 32!
a Linear demand
JQ13Q2
2 u 
3Q2
- i j Ì K - ajh ) 3P ¿P !
3X ■ A lNi 3Ni ! 3Q2 3X j
3N
Therefore --- < 0
3X
♦ fe.fi! ì
(N! 3Nlj 3X 3Q, 3N“j
3P
3A
3X A
Ql ^
3Q2 _3P
3N2 3X
(note : from (4.6)
(b) Stability
Take linear approximations 
the Cournot solutions (N^ , )
of the reaction functions around 
and lag one period to yield
(Ni - N?)t - - I  (N, - N° )
a
« 2  - »5 >e - - ;  « i  - »1 >t-i
which can be combined to give the second order difference equation
(N1 - N? > t  ■ ^  (Nl - N?>t-2 •afl
1 - ' <
r-----
®ll_
L 01 J ----»>- 
_
1
For stability (The CF has the steeper reaction function)
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Cournot stability can be demonstrated in the example as follows (in 
output space to accord with the diagrams).
The reaction functions for LMF and profit maximiser are respectively:
Q~3 (-aQ1 + bQ1Q2 + 2F) - 0 (1)
-2(b + w )Q2 - bQ + a - 0 • (2)
Assume the Cournot solution is (Q^, Q2> then the reaction functions 
may be linearly approximated and subjected to a one period lag so that 
for the LMF and profit-maximising firm respectively
A(Q1 ' ^ t  + B(Q2 " Q2} t-1 = 0 (3)
C(Q1 " Qi> t-1 + E(Q2 " Q^t-1 " 0 (4)
Now, from (3) (Q1 ~ Q°) t - - - (Q2 -
A
and from (4) (Q2 - Q®)t = —  (Qx - qJ)t_1
E
so, <Q2 -qS>t - “ « 2 -<5)t-2 •EA
• PRThis second order difference equation (with unreal roots, —  < 0)
EA
will be stable if
!EA| > |CB|
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where A » (-a bQ2> < O
B = Q^ibQj) > 0 
C - -b < 0 
E - -2(b + w) < 0
Therefore |EA| > j CB| if
Q”3 (a - bQ2)2(b + w) > Qj3b2Q 1
i.e. (a * bQ2)2(b + w) > b ^
i.e. (b + 2w) (a - bQ,) + b(a - bQ2> > b'Q^ ^
i.e. (b + 2w)(a - bQ2> + b(a - bQ^ - bQ2) > 0
i.e. (b + 2w)(a - bQ,) + bP > 0 .
Since P > 0 and (a - bQ,,) = P + bQ^ > 0 the equilibrium is stable. 
In terms of the diagram stability is ensured because the profit- 
maximiser has the steeper reaction function:
-3
dQ. 1 > * 1__|
dQ2 ;rCF dQ2 rl mf
. !*| >
!C| ¡A!
l .e
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1. We would like to thank Yoshinari Miyamoto for his help in 
determining this result.
2. See Miyato (1982) for a discussion of the determinants of the 
slope of the LMF reaction function.
3. It may also be possible to extend the analysis of "mixed duopoly" 
by recasting it in the type of framework recently developed by 
Moulin (1981).
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CHAPTER 5
MANAGERIAL DISCRETION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In the analysis of the previous three chapters the objective 
of the LMF was taken to be the maximisation of income per m ember/^ 
However, as Wiles (1977 p.63) reminds us, we should be careful not 
to simply subsume the theory of the firm under the theory of the 
individual - the firm, strictly speaking, has no interests of its 
own. Account must be taken of the interplay between the various 
individuals and groups who make up the firm. The possibility of 
an alternative model suggests itself as soon as we consider the mechanism 
by which workers attempt to translate their preferences into firm-level 
decisions on matters such as prices, output and employment. They might 
choose to do this through collective discussion, by rotating the decision­
making role among themselves, or by appointing a specialist manager.
It is the third of these options which is to be examined in this chapter.
The possibility that delegating decision-making to a specialist 
manager has important consequences for firm behaviour is a familiar 
theme in the literature on CFs. For example, Baumol (1959), Marris 
(1964) and Williamson (1963, 1964) have each proposed models in which 
managerial discretion plays a central role. More recently, Fama (1980) 
examines the role of the labour market in disciplining managers and 
Cubbin and Leech (1983a) consider the importance of the degree of 
dispersion among shareholders. In addition there have been numerous 
attempts to test empirically the various theoretical predictions, the 
latest of which include Cubbin and Leech (1983b) and Smirlock and 
Marshall (1983).
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In the LMF literature a number of authors claim to have found 
evidence of managerial discretion. In separate studies of Yugoslav 
enterprises, Poole (1978 p. 168), Granick (1975 Ch.12) and Obradovic
(1978) all conclude that workers have relatively little impact on
. . . . (2)decision-making relative to management. Turning to LMFs operating
within capitalist economies, Bradley (1980) claims that in the French,
British and Canadian cooperative ventures of the early 1970's there
is little evidence that managers acted within a framework determined
by workers; rather that "Data show that worker directors tended to
endorse management strategies instigated by experts..." (p.165).
In spite of these case studies and the extensive literature 
relating to CFs, only two theoretical papers, Atkinson (1973) and Law 
(1977), have analysed the possible consequences of managerial discretion 
for LMF behaviour. Atkinson suggests that managers are interested 
in growth and presents a model which examines the implications for 
both LMF and CF growth rates. In contrast our focus,along with that 
of Law, who we return to below, will be short run behaviour. In 
particular we examine the implications for the adjustment of employment 
to changes in demand.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. We begin 
in section 5.2 with a consideration of why LMFs operating in a 
capitalist economy might decide to appoint a specialist manager.
The following section then looks at the likely motivation of managers 
and the constraints to which they are subject. Section 5.4 then sets 
up a simple model based upon this discussion and examines the response
33
of employment to changes in demand.
An important feature of the model, one that it shares with the 
Illyrian LMF, is that decisions concerning employment reductions take 
no account of the fate of the workers who leave. The Illyrian model 
has been criticised in this regard and a modification involving the 
payment of compensation to departing members has been proposed in 
the literature. In section 5.5 we similarly incorporate such a 
scheme and analyse the implications for employment adjustment. A 
short concluding section summarises the main results.
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5.2. THE NEED FOR SPECIALIST MANAGEMENT
A labour-managed firm, just like any other, must undertake 
managerial as well as production tasks. Each requires distinct skills.
As noted above, the appointment of a specialist to the managerial role 
is just one of three options open to the membership. However, both 
the case studies referred to earlier and the following theoretical 
argument concerning the capitalist environment, suggest that this 
may be an important clsss of LMF to examine.
Consider the distribution of managerial skills across the population. 
To the extent that such skills are acquired through on-the-job 
experience a crucial determinant will be the organisation of work 
within CFs. Although there are conflicting viewpoints on the under­
lying rationale, it is generally accepted that CFs exhibit a sharp 
division of labour between managerial and production tasks. Williamson 
(1980) for example emphasises the efficiency gains, in terms of superior 
assignment and contracting performance, which emanate from hierarchy. 
Radical economists such as Braverman (1974) and Marglin (1974), on 
the other hand, claim that "the separation of conception from execution" 
serves to benefit owners at the expense of workers rather than to 
improve efficiency. Whatever the explanation the result is that on- 
the-job management experience is restricted to a small subset of the 
population. Managerial skills may also be obtained through education.
Here again we might expect relatively few people to be provided with 
such skills if it is the case, as Bowles and Gintis (1976) and 
Putterman (1982) suggest, that the system is geared to the requirements 
of capitalist enterprises. A LMF, then, facing a situation in which 
managerial skills are scarce, may on efficiency grounds, choose to
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appoint a specialist rather than adopt collective decision-taking or 
rotation.
A further argument advanced by Bradley (1980), one which is not 
specific to capitalist economies, concerns the need to prevent information 
leaking out to competitors. To make management information available 
to all members would, it is argued, run the risk of leakage and hence 
might threaten the survival of the enterprise. However, as Ireland 
and Law (1982 p.174) point out, restricting the information set to 
specialist management provides no guarantee of security since there 
is nothing to stop them leaving for another firm.
8 6
5.3 MANAGERIAL UTILITY AND CONSTRAINTS
Based on Che work of organisational theorises, Williamson (1963,
1964) suggests that managers of capitalist firms are motivated by the
. (3)following: Salary and other material rewards , power status and
prestige (collectively termed "dominance"), professional excellence
and security. In the absence of theoretical arguments or evidence to
the contrary we shall assume that LMF managers are similarly motivated.
Leaving aside professional excellence, which plays an insignificant
role in Williamson's model and would similarly appear to have little
to contribute here, and security, which is best viewed as a constraint
on behaviour, we now need to consider how these objectives may be
pursued within the LMF.
Salary, we assume, will be related by a constant differential to 
the incomes of production workers. Another source of material 
rewards, and possibly also of status and prestige, are "emoluments" 
which the manager may be able to consume out of the surplus prior to 
the distribution of incomes. "Emoluments" are defined by Williamson 
(1963 p. 1035) as rewards which have zero productivities and, if 
removed, would not cause the manager to seek alternative employment. 
Examples of activities which might contribute to emoluments include 
entertaining clients, travel, and use of a company car. In Williamson's 
model the power, status and prestige of the manager is enhanced by 
the expansion of staff. Given that our interest is in short run 
comparative statics we shall take the number of staff as constant 
and, for simplicity, fix it at one - the manager. A final possibility 
to consider is that the number of production workers is a contributor 
to utility perhaps, as Law (1977) suggests, because it is a determinant 
of managerial salary. We shall, however, not include this term in the
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utility function since, as noted above, we have chosen an alternative 
assumption regarding salary and in any case the implications for short- 
run adjustment have already been examined in Law (1977).
Our managerial utility function thus contains two elements - 
salary and emoluments. As will be seen presently, even this extremely 
simple specification, in combination with the constraints to which we 
now turn, generates some interesting predictions on short-run employment 
behaviour.
Atkinson (1973) suggested that the constraint faced by a LMF 
manager would be some minimum level of income per worker required by 
the workforce. This is consistent with the assumption, on which much 
of the literature is based, that the objective of a (non-managerial)
LMF will be the maximisation of income per worker. However, Atkinson 
did not attempt to explore the determinants of this minimum level, 
but simply treated it as an exogenous parameter. By contrast we 
shall demonstrate that a consideration of the factors determining the 
constraint is no less important than the specification of the managerial 
utility function in the determination of LMF behaviour.
The extent to which managerial utility can be increased at the 
expense of production workers is limited by two factors - the utility
available to the workers outside the firm, and their ability to monitor
(4)Lae manager. The first of these, which we term the "exit-constraint",
is simply that if production workers' incomes, y, fall below those 
available outside the LMF, y, they will leave. Our "monitoring constraint" 
is adapted from a specification suggested by Yarrow (1976) in his 
analysis of monitoring by shareholders in a CF.
The potential benefit per worker if the manager is perfectly 
monitored is (y*-y) where y* is defined as the income level attainable 
if the manager acts solely in the interests of the workers. Thus for 
any coalition of workers of size the total benefit would be
(y*-y).
Let be the cost to coalition i of intervening to enforce
actions which yield y* and let Z » max {N.(y*-y) - K.}. The
i
manager is safe as long as Z < 0. The monitoring constraint may 
therefore be written
y 5 y* - k where k = min { i/^ }
i ‘ i
The level of monitoring costs, k, will depend on a variety of 
structural factors. One important consideration will be the rules 
concerning the relationship between manager and production workers.
Under this heading would come, for example, statutory requirements 
to reveal certain types of information or to discuss particular issues 
with the workforce, the frequency of workers' meetings, and whether 
or not trade unions are p r e s e n t . A  second structural characteristic 
which may be relevant is the technology involved. This could affect 
monitoring costs in at least two ways. First, the more complex the 
technology the more difficult it may be for workers to decide whether 
optimal policies are being pursued by the manager. The second effect 
is through the spatial arrangements dictated by technology - the less 
on-the-job contact between workers the more difficult it may be for 
them to communicate and organise.(^  A further element of structure 
which may be important is the educational and skill level of the workforce 
- education and training may be expected to facilitate monitoring
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although, as Espinosa and Zimbalist (1981 p.97) point out, it may be 
true only of specialist and not general education.
Since our concern is with short-run behaviour, we shall be 
holding these factors, and hence monitoring cost, constant. However, 
as we shall see, the value of k is an important determinant of 
both the initial equilibrium and comparative static response of 
the enterprise.
A further simplification is that monitoring costs are assumed to be 
independent of the level of emoluments. In practice, changes in level 
are likely to involve variations in the type of emoluments consumed and 
some will be more easy to monitor than others. Recognition of this 
might be important in any attempt to compare LMFs and CFs since outside 
shareholders and workers will differ in their capacity to directly 
observe the actions of managers.
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In order to focus attention on the role of managerial discretion 
we assume that the LMF produces a single output, Q, using just one 
variable input, the number of workers, N. Management, by contrast, 
is an element of overheads and therefore does not vary with output.
The output is sold on a competitive market at a price, P. This last 
assumption is adopted so that when compensation is introduced in the 
following section we are able to compare our results with non-managerial 
models involving compensation, all of which assume price-taking.^
Income per worker is given by
5.4 THE BASIC MODEL
where F denotes the level of fixed costs and M the manager's 
emoluments.
Following the discussion in section 5.3 above, the manager's 
utility is assumed to depend upon salary 9y, where 8 is a parameter, 
and emoluments. For simplicity we shall set 9 equal to unity, this 
having no qualitative effect on the results. The objective of the 
manager is then to
PQ - F - M
N
(5.1)
max U « U ( y , M) 
N,M
(5.2)
subject to a production function
Q - Q(N), QN > o, Qnn < o (5.3)
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and to the monitoring and exit constraints discussed above. These 
are, respectively,
Three types of equilibrium are possible. First, neither the monitoring 
nor exit constraint may be binding on the manager. This will be more 
likely the greater the weight given to y in U(*). the higher is k 
and the lower is y. Secondly, the monitoring constraint may be 
binding. Finally, the larger is k, the higher is y and the more 
weight given to M, the more likely it is that the exit constraint 
will be binding. Each of these cases is now analysed in turn.
Neither constraint binding.
The equilibrium of the LMF is given by the maximisation of 
(5.2) subject to (5.1) and (5.3). This yields a pair of first-order 
conditions
y s y* - k (5.4)
y > y (5.5)
N
(5.6)
Uy, + U - 0
'n m
(5.7)
Since . >0, (5.6) implies
'n
PQN - y - o (5.6’)
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We wish Co examine how employment responds Co demand changes, so 
totally differentiating (5.6*) and (5.7) respectively we obtain
PQNNdN + I dM = (N ' V  dP
and hence
dN
iu 2U
-u : . _ m  + u
n 2  „ m m dM , 1 • U -U ,u yy  yM n
*■ y
(5.8)
dP (5.9)
dN
dP
Q _
N <N
[—  •» K
iu  y y  yM| N 
1 y
/ N i
(5.10)
H
where A
U 2U
_ZiL _ __&L
MM
and PQ,NN
U
■ A - JL
Now, ( v  - Q^) is positive from (5.6') and A is negative by convexity 
of the indifference curves to the origin (see appendix). Also, if, 
as we assume, the second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied
then H is positive. To sign (‘"m
uy
set dN » 0:
U - U ) consider (5.9) and
y y  y>t
\#
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3M 
3P
_____________________  . (5.11)
A
__M „
U * -y
- Uyy yM
This indicates how a manager adjusts emoluments in response to a 
change in revenue if employment was fixed. A reasonable assumption 
would be that emoluments (and income) would be increased if revenue 
rose. Thus if emoluments are a "normal good" then (5.11) is positive
and hence
u yy y
is negative.
dNAs a consequence, the sign of /^  could be either positive or 
negative. In the event of a price rise the former possibility is of 
particular interest since it contrasts with the "perverse" response 
of the Illyrian firm. It is illustrated in figure 1.
Figure 5.1
¿ 4
At the initial price, Pg, managerial utility is maximised with 
employment Ng and emoluments Mg. The two first-order conditions 
(5.6') and (5.7*) are depicted in the left- and right-hand sectors 
respectively. First, for given M there is the familiar condition 
that membership is chosen to equate income per worker with the marginal 
revenue product. Secondly, for a given N the manager allocates 
revenue between income and emoluments so that the marginal rate of 
substitution equals the marginal rate of transformation.
A rise in price to P^ then generates two opposing forces on N.
For a given M there is the usual Illyrian tendency to reduce N but 
if M is "normal" it will increase and this acts, as would an increase 
in fixed costs, to raise the optimal size of the workforce. '
In certain circumstances the second effect may dominate as it does 
in figure 5.1, where membership expands from Ng to following
the price rise.
Monitoring constraint binding.
If the monitoring constraint is binding then y - y*-k where 
y* is the income generated if the manager acted purely in the 
interests of the workforce and hence is given by
y* = max {— . (5.12)
N N
Since the level of income is given at y* - k the objective 
for the manager is simply to
Max M
N
PQ - F - (y*-k)N
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This yields the first-order condition
PQn * <y*"k) - 0 (5.14)
The equilibrium is depicted in figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2
Since the income level is given the manager behaves just as 
would the manager of a CF maximising profit subject to an exogenous 
wage rate, choosing an employment level such that the marginal revenue 
product equals the payment to workers.
When we proceed to examine the comparative static response to a 
price change, however, the situation is no longer analogous to a 
profit maximising firm because in our case (y*-k) is itself a function
of P. Taking account of the endogeneity of y*, differentiation of 
(5.14) (see appendix) yields
dN (5.15)
dP
where Q* and N* are the values of Q and N which satisfy (5.12). 
This can be signed unambiguously as follows. The point (y*,N*)
Since the employment level, N^, which satisfies (5.14) is greater 
than N* and is negative the numerator of (5.15) is positive and
the term as a whole is negative.
Thus we find that if the manager is constrained by the monitoring 
activities of the workers there will be an inverse relationship 
between membership size and the price level. The firm therefore 
responds to price changes in the same direction as Ward's Illyrian LMF.
Exit constraint binding.
Finally, we consider the case where it is the ability of members 
to earn some income level y outside the LMF which is the binding 
constraint on the manager. As in the previous case the manager, 
faced with a given income level, will simply choose employment to 
obtain the highest possible level of emoluments. Thus the objective is 
to
is generated by the condition PQ,. = — ----  as can be seen inXTN
figure 5.2. This tells us that ^ 5- > QM
N*
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max M - PQ - F - Nÿ (5.16)
N
which yields the first-order condition
PQN - y = 0 . (5.17)
The equilibrium is shown in figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3
Since y is exogenous it is not only the first-order condition 
but also the comparative static response that is analogous to a profit 
maximising firm in this case. Thus we find that
P^NN
dN
dP
(5.18)
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which is positive. A binding exit constraint therefore causes the 
manager to adjust employment in the opposite direction to the Illyrian 
firm.
What is emerging from our analysis so far, then, is, first, that 
the incorporation of a managerial utility function into the LMF 
model has important consequences for short-run behaviour of the enter­
prise and secondly that it is not only the elements in the utility 
function but also the nature of the constraints facing the manager 
which play a central role.
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5.5 EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT WITH COMPENSATION
The Illyrian prediction that a price rise leads to a contraction
in employment has been criticised by a number of authors on grounds
that what is then being maximised is the incomes of those that remain
with no account taken of the fate of dismissed workers. As noted
in chapter 2, Steinherr and Thisse (1979) suggest that for an employment
reduction to be fair to all members one of two procedures must be
followed. Either a vote is taken on the optimum membership level with
everyone having an equal chance of being selected for dismissal in the
event of a desired contraction, or those who leave be compensated by
the remaining workers such that all are indifferent between staying
and leaving. For our purposes an important difference between the
procedures is that the voting rule requires membership involvement
in decision making whereas with the compensation scheme control can
still rest with the manager. We shall therefore restrict ourselves
to the l a t t e r . M o r e  generally, it is interesting to note that a
vote plus random selection is only ex ante fair whereas it is possible
to design a compensation scheme which is ex post egalitarian. The
procedure suggested by Ireland and Law (1978), and examined in chapter 2,
is of this type since it requires compensation to be paid such that,
after payment of transfers, each workers receives the same income.
In the remainder of the chapter we apply their scheme to the managerial
model presented above. Thus whereas in the previous section the rules
of the LMF stipulated that all current members receive the same income,
the new rule requires that all the initial members be paid the same
whether or not they are currently working in the LMF. It is important
to be clear that the manager has no discretion in this matter - the
rules are laid down by the membership and enforcement is assumed to be
( 12 )costless.
ÎOO
Let Nq be the equilibrium membership at an initial price 
Pg. If price now changes to the compensation rule requires
the replacement of (5.1) with
iP1Q - F - M N >, N.
y - i
P1Q - F - M (N0  - N)
C N < N„
(5.19a)
(5.19b)
where C, the amount of compensation, equates the post-transfer 
incomes of stayers and leavers and hence is given by
C = y - y (5.20)
The scheme has no effect in situations where the manager would otherwise 
increase membership so (5.19a) is identical to (5.1). However,
(5.19b) is different because if employment is reduced the NQ - N 
workers who leave must be compensated by an amount C. If we use 
(5.20) to simplify (5.19b) to
y - P1 Q + (N0 _N) y ~ F " M N < N- (5.21)
we see that income per worker now depends, in part, on the earnings 
of the Nq - N who leave. The manager will, as a result of the scheme, 
therefore take account of the fate of departing workers.
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It is useful at this stage to recall the distinction between 
membership and employment suggested in chapter 2. In the Ireland 
and Law scheme the number employed within the enterprise may be reduced 
but all Nq remain members in the sense that they are entitled to 
equal incomes. Although rigid downwards membership would be increased 
if it raised income per worker (in the Ireland and Law version) or 
managerial utility (in our model).
We now proceed to examine the consequences for employment 
adjustment, beginning with the case where neither the monitoring 
nor exit constraint is binding.
Neither Constraint Binding
The introduction of the compensation scheme means that for 
N < Nq (5.2) is now maximised subject to (5.21) rather than (5.1).
The following pair of first-order conditions are obtained.
U
y/N (PQN - y) = 0  • N < No
Um - Uy/No - 0 , N < N0
U
Since y/„ > 0 , (5.22) implies
N 0
pqn -  y -  o , n < n0 .
Notice that, unlike (5.6') in the model without compensation, (5.22') is
(5.22)
(5.23)
(5.22')
not a function of M.
1C2
Intuitively, the reason why we no longer have a pair of simultaneous
equations to consider is that membership, that is, the number entitled 
to equal incomes, is now fixed at Nq . In deciding on N the 
manager is thus simply concerned to maximise total "revenue", which 
includes the earnings, y, of each of the departing workers. The 
level of emoluments is irrelevant here. Once N has been chosen the 
manager proceeds to decide on the distribution between y and M. 
Hence the decision regarding N and M has been transformed from a 
simultaneous to a sequential process. Whatever the final choice of M, 
we can therefore simply look to
which is obtained from (5.21), to see whether the manager will benefit 
from a reduction in employment. As we would expect, it simply depends 
upon whether a member contributes more within the firm (P^QN) or outside
a contraction in employment might follow either a price rise or price 
fall. Is this still the case when compensation must be paid?
and the assumption that the exit constraint is not binding we know that 
Pq Qjj i y* Expression (5.24) is therefore positive indicating that a 
contraction in employment would reduce managerial utility. Employment 
will not therefore be reduced following an increase in price. This 
result accords with the impact of the scheme when applied to the standard 
(non-managerial) model (Ireland and Law 1982 pp. 21-22).
a
3. * N < N,0 (5.24)N N,
0
(y)
In section 5.4 it was shown that, in the absence of compensation,
Consider first a price increase from to P^. From (5.6')
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In the event of a price fall, however, (5.24) could be either 
positive or negative. Figure 5.4 depicts a situation where it is 
negative.
Figure 5.4
In the absence of compensation the fall in price from to
could, given a sufficient reduction in emoluments from their initial 
level, Nq , lead to a contraction in employment. Furthermore, in
order that incomes do not fall below y this contraction must be at
(13)least to N', although it could go further. ' Consider now the impact 
of compensation payments. From (5.24) we see that employment will never 
fall beyond N', because beyond that point workers' alternative earnings 
are less than their contribution within the firm.
So, whilst the compensation does remove the possibility of a 
"perverse" response, a reduction in employment is still a possibility 
following a fall in price. In this latter case the scheme has the 
effect of limiting the extent of the contraction in employment.
Monitoring Constraint Binding
The first point of interest here is that, unlike the unconstrained 
case above, the compensation scheme will influence the position of the 
initial equilibrium. To see this, consider figure 5.5
Figure 5.5
In the absence of the compensation scheme we have seen that 
income per member will be y* - k and employment N^. The workforce 
realise that if the manager could be prevented from consuming emoluments 
then income per member would increase to y*, but since enforcement 
costs an amount k they are prepared to accept y* - k. The important
point to note now is that to attain y* the membership has to be
reduced from Nq to N*. This means that if we now require that 
compensation has to be paid to departing members then, from an initial 
point Ng, y* can no longer be achieved.
To see what income could be attained let us remove managerial 
emoluments and examine what happens if employment is reduced. (Obviously 
there is never an incentive to increase membership.) Replacing 
in (5.21) with Pq and setting M « 0, the expression for income per 
membe r be come s:
than or equal to y. Thus incomes cannot be raised by reducing employment 
and in general they would fall. The reason is the familiar one 
concerning contributions to total "revenue" from within and outside 
the firm. So the best that the members could achieve through costless 
monitoring would be y rather that y*. But this in turn means that 
the initial equilibrium income cannot be y* - k . The reason is chat 
the difference between Che two is less than the enforcement cost - given
P0Q + (Nq “ N)y - F
N < N, (5.25)y o
The effect of a reduction in employment is then
3
N N,
(5.26)
0
This is non-negative because, as can be seen from figure 5.5, PqQn 
evaluated at Nq equals y* - k and the latter by assumption is greater
Nq the manager could safely reduce incomes beyond y* - k to y - k.
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However, even this is not optimal because income is not then equated 
with marginal revenue product. Thus to find the equilibrium we reduce 
incomes from y* - k and at the same time expand employment so that 
income continues to be equated with marginal revenue product. The 
equilibrium will therefore be at an employment level where the vertical 
distance » , between y(Pg, M - 0) and PgQ^ e<lua  ^ to *t' *n 
figure 5.6 (y^ - k, N^) represents such an equilibrium. With
perfect monitoring the members would receive y^ (remember they can 
do no better than remaining at NQ) and the difference between this 
and actual incomes paid, y^ - k, just equals the enforcement cost.
Figure 5.6
To examine how employment will respond to a change in price we 
need to see what happens to the y(M«0) and marginal revenue product 
schedules. The effect of a change in price, evaluated at NQ, is
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given by
/
àP
(5.27)
This is positive because, as can be seen from figure 5.6,
PqQ - F
N
A price fall will therefore reduce v and hence cause the 
manager to expand employment (see note 14) until v is again equated 
with k. A rise in price will increase v but this will not, however,
lead to a reduction in employment. This is because, once again,
P1^N > y as can be seen in figure 5.6. The manager will, of course,
have to raise incomes up to y^ - k, but employment remains fixed 
at Nq  . Thus, as in the unconstrained case, the introduction of 
compensation prevents a "perverse" response to an increase in price.
Exit Constraint Binding
A binding exit constraint means that, even without a compensation
scheme, income per worker inside the LMF is always equal to the alternative 
income available outside. Introducing the scheme will therefore have 
no effect at all, and hence the positive relationship between employment 
and price described in section 5.4 continues to hold.
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5.6 CONCLUSIONS
Members of a LMF sometimes decide to appoint a specialist to 
undertake the managerial tasks. At the outset of the chapter we 
noted that, whilst evidence from case studies suggests that managerial 
discretion may then emerge, the issue has received little theoretical 
attention. In the remainder of the chapter the implications of 
specialist management for short-run employment behaviour are explored 
in the context of a simple model. The results are summarised in 
table 5.1.(15)
Table 5.1
COMPARATIVE STATIC RESPONSES: dN/dp
Income per 
Worker 
Maximising 
LMF
MANAGERIAL LMF
No Binding 
Constraint
Monitoring
Constraint
Exit
Constraint
Binding Binding
Basic Model - + 0  or - - +
Model with dP> 0  
dP <0
0 + or 0 0 ♦
Compensation,
Scheme - + 0  or - ♦
Our analysis suggests first of all, that managerial discretion 
can have major implications for short-run behaviour. For example 
the top row of table 5.1 reveals that the negative relationship 
between employment and product price which characterises the Illyrian 
firm may be transformed into a positive one. Secondly, it is not only 
the objectives of managers but also the nature of the constraints they
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face which is of fundamental importance. The final points of interest
concern the introduction of a rule which, in the event of a contraction 
of employment, requires that departing members be compensated such that 
all original members end up with the same income. The effects of 
such a scheme are described in the lower two rows. In the left hand 
column the scheme is applied to the Illyrian firm. The consequence, 
established by Ireland and Law (1982 pp. 21-23) is that employment 
remains unchanged following a price rise. Columns two and three reveal 
that the possibility of a "perverse" response is also replaced by 
downward rigidity in the managerial model. It is interesting to note, 
however, that in our model the scheme does not preclude employment 
contractions - they remain a possibility in the event of a fall in 
product price.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5
1. SIGN OF TERM "A"
We have the utility function U ■ U (M, y)
Convexity of the indifference curves to the origin implies
u u u uM o — sail ♦  -4 . u & -
u2 * yM u 2U yy dM uy y y y
dvSince “ - /y this becomes
y
4
U? n  ~ 
y
Hi
2f V  + H *  < 0  ’
y
UMUsing -2- - 
Uy
—  (equation 5.7) we obtain the required result 
N
u
-ZL _
N2 * %  * 0  •
2. OBTAINING (5.15) FROM (5.14)
We have PQ^ - (y* - k) • 0
Totally differentiating,
P^NN * ♦ IdPdP J
0
Ill
Now, y* - - F
N* (P)
dy* m 1
r p
dP N*
i
. 91 +
r
N*P
N*
but, | . J « o from
, dy* _ (J*^
dP N*
Q*,
. dN _ 'N* - %
dP pQnn
dQ*
dN* (PQ* - F)
N*  2
N*^ dP
dN*
dP
(PQ* - F)
 the first order condition for y*
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MOTES TO CHAPTER 5
1. As we have seen it is important, in the event of membership 
reduction, to distinguish between those members who remain 
in the firm and all original members.
2. See also Comisso (1979) and Estrin and Bartlett (1982 p.8 6 ).
It should be noted, however, that while workers may play minor roles 
in decision-making, this does not necessarily imply that management 
are pursuing objectives which differ from those of the workers.
3. As Williamson himself recognises, these are strictly speaking not 
motives in themselves but means of satisfying them.
In relation to capitalist firms, Fama (1980) suggests that the 
main factor which deters managers from pursuing non-profit 
goals is the existence of a managerial labour market. The 
monitoring activities of the market, it is argued, would reduce 
the price of a manager's services in proportion to any sacrifice 
of profits. Whatever the validity of this argument in relation 
to CFs it is clear that a well developed market does not exist 
for LMF managers within a capitalist economy. Similarly, the absence 
of equity in LMFs precludes monitoring by the stock market.
A recent study by the Wales TUC (Logan and Gregory, 1981) lists 
various ways in which trade unions might contribute to cooperatives. 
Among these is the protection of workers against managerialism 
or other degenerations of democratic principles.
6 . See, for example, Reich and Devine (1981 p.31)
7. The CF managerial models referred to above all assume downward- 
sloping demand schedules on grounds that under perfect competition 
only profit-maximisers would survive. The context for our analysis 
however is a small, emerging LMF sector within a capitalist 
economy, and is therefore not a long-run equilibrium. Product 
market competition may require the LMF to be a price-taker but 
possible efficiency advantages may leave scope for managerial 
discretion. Moreover, we would anyway expect our results to
go through in those circumstances where increases in demand 
under imperfect competition lead to a perverse response by the 
Illyrian firm. An elasticity-preserving demand shift is such a 
case (see Ireland and Law 1982 pp. 116-117).
8 . This contrasts with Williamson's (1963, 1964) model of a CF since 
a change in emoluments has no effect on optimal output. The same 
is of course true of fixed cost changes in CFs.
jfi*
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9. “m—  . U - Uu yy y« < 0  is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for > 0. On the other hand
dN ,
IT • U “  Uyy yM
is sufficient for /^  to be negative. For example,
if U » y + m * , 0 < < 5 < l ,  the indifference curves are vertically
rU
—  . U__- U » 0  and —  < 0. Obviously the more
dP
parallel, U
U yy y 
v y
strongly normal is M the more likely it is, ceteris paribus,
that > 0 .
dP
10. For further discussion of the former see Brewer and Browning (1982) .
11. In contrast, remaining workers do worse than leavers in the 
Steinherr and Thisse (1979) scheme. See Ireland and Law (1982 p.22) 
for a comparison of the two schemes.
12. Also, it may be someone other than the manager who is responsible 
for distributing the income fund among the membership.
13. It can be seen from figure 5.4 that a maximum to the right of N' 
has a value of income per member below y, which violates the 
exit constraint.
14. For this to be an equilibrium we also require -- >
3N
Consider what would happen if, on the contrary,
—  * 0. The manager would be able to reduce incomes
aN
0 .
and increase
employment because v would not rise beyond k. This process 
would continue until the exit constraint became binding.
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15. In all cases the initial equilibrium is that which would
obtain in the absence of a compensation scheme. If we did not 
begin from this point then the responses may differ from 
those shown in the table. Consider, for example, the income 
per worker maximising LMF. If the initial employment level 
was not Nq but rather N0 such that Ni < N0 < N0 then
fall 
»!<
from P0 to Pi would induce a contraction of employment to
16. Yarrow (1976) makes the same point regarding managerialism 
in capitalist firms.
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CHAPTER 6
THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF CAPITALIST AND 
LABOUR-MANAGED PRODUCTION
6.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we aim, both theoretically and empirically, to 
compare the efficiency of labour-managed and capitalist production.
This task requires that we complete the shift, begun in Chapter 5, 
away from the "black box" treatment of the firm. The previous chapter, 
whilst pointing to the dangers of treating the firm as if it were an 
individual, retained the simple production function and workers' 
utility functions of the earlier chapters. In contrast, now that the 
focus of attention is the efficiency of two different organisational 
forms, both the production process and workers'utility move to the 
centre of the analysis. Also important will be the nature of contracting 
involving the suppliers of labour inputs to the firm.
6.2 THEORY
This section seeks to contribute to the theoretical debate in a number 
of ways. Firstly, discussions of relative performance frequently fail to 
establish at the outset precisely what is to be understood by the 
"efficiency" of an enterprise. We begin, therefore, with a definition of 
efficiency. A further characteristic of the literature is simply the 
diversity of approaches. This makes it difficult to attempt an overall 
evaluation. We therefore suggest a number of broad categories to which 
the arguments can be allocated and examine how each impinges on overall 
efficiency. Thirdly, specific criticisms are directed at Williamson's 
(1980) analysis of relative contracting costs. It is argued that his
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final evaluation is inconsistent with the analysis which precedes it. 
Finally, we point out that whilst the notion of "atmosphere" plays an 
important role in Williamson's (1975) examination of the relative 
efficiency of firms and markets, it is much less prominent in the 
subsequent evaluation of different forms of internal organisation. 
Specifically, there is no analysis of likely differences in atmosphere 
and also it appears to be regarded as something to set against 
organisational efficiency. In contrast we shall argue that atmosphere 
should be regarded as an element contributing to efficiency and that 
the work of psychologists suggests that differences will exist between 
labour-managed and capitalist modes of production.
The productive efficiency of an enterprise is defined with 
reference to the utilities of individuals within the firm. Pareto 
efficiency occurs when no one individual can achieve higher utility 
without another getting less. The possibility that labour-managed 
and capitalist production might differ in efficiency is a frequent theme 
in the literature, with a variety of suggestions as to possible sources 
of such a differential. These arguments fall into one or other of the 
following categories.
First, the two organisational forms may have different incentive 
and/or monitoring properties. The debate on this issue is normally 
conducted with respect to the supply of effort but it is also pertinent 
to other aspects of performance such as product quality, care of 
equipment and thefts. Secondly, we need to examine the ability of 
firms to perform what Williamson (1980) terms "assignment" tasks.
These include allocating workers to the jobs to which they are most 
suited. Thirdly, and again borrowing Williamson's terminology, organ­
isations may differ in terms of "atmosphere". In this category 
would be included the assertion that capitalist production is alienating 
to workers. A fourth set of arguments concern possible difficulties
LMFs may have with regard to investment decisions. Finally, if 
transactions are not always conducted under perfectly competitive 
conditions the possibility that bargaining costs during contracting 
differ between the two types of firm needs to be considered.
Given the diversity of these arguments it is important, before 
embarking on a detailed examination, to consider how they relate to 
overall efficiency. The following diagram which encompasses both 
capitalist and labour-managed production, may provide a useful 
integrating framework.
Figure 6.1
REWARD
I
The vertical axis measures the reward received by an individual 
from working in the enterprise. It is made up of both money income 
(or, more accurately, the consumption bundle thereby afforded) and the 
psychic rewards associated with atmosphere. On the horizontal axis 
is labour input, i, which for present purposes we can think of as 
effort. For each value of l the function f ( 0  gives the level of 
individual reward generated within the firm.
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If there was just one person in the firm (s)he would choose point 
e - the tangency between the production function and the highest 
attainable indifference curve. Now suppose the firm comprises a number 
of individuals who, for simplicity, are assumed to be identical. We 
can then draw a distinction between incentives and monitoring on the 
one hand and the remaining four attributes on the other. Performance 
with respect to the former dictates the position that can be achieved 
on a given f(l) schedule. In figure 6.1 the identical individuals 
would each desire point e. However, if rewards are not tied perfectly 
to effort then in general the equilibrium will not be at e. Usually 
the problem will be one of shirking although in certain circumstances 
an over-supply of labour is p o s s i b l e . T h e  better the incentive 
and monitoring characteristics the closer to e the firm will get.
In the traditional neo-classical competitive model a CF which failed 
to provide workers with their desired mix of effort and income would 
incur higher costs and hence sacrifice profit. The remaining 
attributes, by contrast, determine the position of the f(4) schedule. 
Thus, for example, if labour-managed production generates a superior 
work atmosphere to capitalist production then, other things being 
equal, the LMF's schedule would lie above that of the CF. Overall 
efficiency is given by the highest indifference curve that can be 
reached and clearly this depends upon both the position of the 
production function and the points that are obtainable along any 
given schedule.
Before moving on to the debate over relative efficiency we should 
be clear that the above framework is intended merely as an aid to 
organising thoughts. An important simplification is that the attributes 
have been treated as though they were separable. Often this will not 
be the case. For example, Ireland (1981) presents a model in which
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atmosphere affects the disutility of supplying effort and hence the 
equilibrium labour supply per individual.
Incentives and Monitoring
A seminal contribution to the analysis of incentive and monitoring 
properties of labour-managed and capitalist production is Alchian and
Demsetz (1972). Their starting point is that gains are available to 
factor owners if they form a team. For example, two people may jointly
lift a heavy cargo into trucks. A crucial feature of team production 
is that it is difficult to determine each individual's contribution 
to output. The output is yielded by a team and is not simply the sum 
of outputs produced by each of the inputs. In other words, the production 
function is not separable. Given that monitoring is costly there is then 
an incentive for each member of the team to shirk, because each receives
the full benefit of shirking but only pays a proportion of the
. ( 2)cost - the remainder is borne by the rest of the team. Alchian and
Demsetz then proceed to argue that the "classical" CF is the organisational
form best able to minimise the degree of shirking. The distinguishing
features of such a firm are as follows. First, there is a specialist
monitor. In order to reap the gains from specialisation there must
also be an incentive for the monitor to monitor. Thus, secondly, the
specialist monitor must also be the residual claimant. That is, s(he)
receives any surplus after the contractual payments to other factor
owners. Finally, in order to be able to discipline the team and hence
minimise shirking this individual also requires the power to alter
or terminate any contract.
Alchian and Demsetz's argument is subjected to a number of criticisms 
by Putterman (1984). To begin with, it is not obvious on either 
incentive or ability grounds that centralised monitoring is superior 
to decentralised monitoring. With regard to the former, Putterman
wHgew*»
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draws upon Mirlees (1976) . Although concerned with the situation where 
all monitoring is undertaken by a single agent, Mirrlees suggests that 
a model of the kind he presents "... would also enable one to consider 
under what circumstances it would pay a group of workers to have one of 
their number undertake all the performance observation, and when it 
would instead pay to have a symmetric solution in which each worker 
devotes some of his time to "monitoring"...." and concludes,
"It is not obvious that the asymmetric solution outlined here, and 
assumed optimal by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), is in fact optimal 
when the means of production are owned in conmon". (1976, p.128).
Turning to the ability to monitor, the point is simply that the 
nature of the task may be such that workers can more easily monitor 
each other than could a third party. Putterman suggests that Alchian 
and Demsetz'sown example of two people lifting a cargo may be such a 
case. If on the other hand there are benefits to having a specialist 
monitor then there is of course nothing to prevent a LMF appointing 
someone to the task. Alchian and Demsetz would respond that the monitor, 
not being the residual claimant, will lack incentive. However, account 
must also be taken of the incentives for workers to supply the input 
being monitored. It may be more efficient to use the residual as a 
direct incentive to the workforce rather than indirectly via the 
incentive to monitor.
A further argument, not considered by Putterman, concerns the 
sanctions which are applied to workers who shirk. In a CF the instrument 
available to the monitor is to terminate the contract. This may, 
however, involve costs and if the worker is aware of these then s(he) 
knows that it is safe to engage in some degree of shirking. In a LMF 
on the other hand, where workers collectively suffer from shirking
by an individual, an additional and relatively costless sanction, 
namely peer group pressure, is available. Chinn (1979), for example, 
describes how "team cohesion" serves to stimulate labour supply in
. . (3)Chinese agricultural collectives.
Williamson (1980), building upon his analysis in "Markets and 
Hierarchies" (1975), attempts a comprehensive evaluation of the 
relative efficiency of a number of organisational f orms.^ Two of 
these, the authority relation and the peer group, are of particular 
interest to us. The authority relation is a mode in which the capitalist 
owns the equipment and product and in which control is hierarchical.
In the peer group, by contrast, equipment and product are owned collective 
by workers and control is democratic. For present purposes these modes 
can be viewed as corresponding to capitalist and labour-managed production 
respectively. Williamson considers eleven efficiency criteria and 
awards the various modes of production a score of zero or one on each. 
Among the criteria are five incentive attributes. These, together with 
the scores received by the authority relation and peer group are as
follows.
Authority Peer 
Relation Group
Work intensity 0 0
Care in equipment utilisation 1 1
Responsiveness to local shocks such as machine 
breakdown or worker illness
Propensity for local work process innovations 0 1
Responsiveness to system shocks and propensity 
for system innovations
The suggestion from this table is then that the LMF has superior incentive 
properties. However, a serious problem with the analysis is that 
because a total of six different modes are being evaluated the binary
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scoring syscem may be too crude to indicate a ranking between the 
authority relation and peer group. Moreover the discussion in the 
text is of no help to us since on none of the five attributes is there 
any analysis of the relative performance of the two inodes in question. 
Finally, we are given no explanation as to why there is one type 
of incentive for which the peer group is superior while in all the 
others the two types of firm are considered to be equally efficient. 
Given that the incentive issue is always one of individual versus 
collective optimality we might expect a consistent ranking for all 
five categories. In each case, then, it would be a consideration of 
the above arguments arising from the debate between Alchian and 
Demsetz and Putterman which would enable a view to be formed on the 
relative performance of capitalist and labour-managed production.
Assignment
Williamson (1980) distinguishes three types of assignment which 
organisations must undertake:
Authority Peer
Relation Group
Assigning workers to tasks 1 0
Leadership 1 0
Contracting 1 1
Unfortunately, Williamson does not elaborate on the reasons behind 
the rankings on the first two categories. A crucial factor would appear 
to be his requirement that in a peer group leadership must be rotated 
among all of the membership. As Putterman (1981) points out, this would
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put the peer group at a disadvantage since it prevents specialisation.
The question to be asked is whether for our purposes a requirement to 
rotate the leadership role should form part of the definition of a LMF.
Williamson justifies the requirement on the grounds that a specialist 
manager enjoys a strategic advantage over other members of the firm 
as a result of having superior information. In consequence, "It 
is really a fiction, when such an elite develops, to maintain that a 
peer group any longer exists - even if, in principle, the group can 
always challenge and even reverse individual decisions. Simple 
hierarchy effectively obtains" (1975 pp. 52-53). However, whilst it 
is important to recognise that a degree of managerial discretion may 
well emerge, this does not provide sufficient grounds for discounting 
the ultimate authority of the workforce. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, the nature of the constraints faced by the manager play a 
major role in determining enterprise behaviour. It seems reasonable 
therefore to agree with Putterman (1981, 1984) that LMF members may 
be permitted to delegate the managerial role to a specialist without 
fear that the essential distinction between labour-managed and capitalist 
production is thereby obscured.
A further point to note here is that, whilst recognising the 
possibility of gains from specialist decision-taking, we should not 
neglect the potentially constructive role that workers may play. In 
certain circumstances assignments may be more efficient if workers 
are consulted beforehand; and in this respect a participatory structure 
seems likely to be superior to hierarchy since, by definition, it is 
more conducive to the flow of ideas from workers. This argument is 
also relevant to performance with regard to local innovations. Whereas
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Williamson (1980) views the propensity to innovate as a function of 
incentives it is clear that the structure of communication channels 
with workers are also important.^
The last of Williamson's assignment categories, contracting, will 
be considered in a separate section below. We choose to do this for 
two reasons. First, there are arguments which suggest that this may 
be a major source of efficiency differences between the two types of 
firm. Williamson, we see from the above table, does not take this 
view. Secondly, these differences relate to bilateral monopoly 
considerations rather than efficiency in making assignments.
Atmosphere
In "Markets and Hierarchies", Williamson argues that whereas the 
"standard economic model" assumes that individuals regard transactions 
in a neutral, instrumental, manner, in some situations it is important 
to take account of the fact that the exchange process itself may be 
an object of value. Thus among other things individuals may be concerned 
with the quality of the exchange relation, or "atmosphere". Furthermore, 
since modes of organisation may differ non-trivially in this respect the 
implication is that "...organisational effectiveness be viewed more 
broadly than the usual efficiency calculus would dictate" (1975, 
pp. 38-39). The analysis which follows, however, concerns only the 
distinction between market exchange and internal organisation. It is 
only in a short footnote to his concluding remarks that the possibility 
of variations in atmosphere across different modes of internal organisation 
is raised - "...the peer group may be preferred to hierarchy in this
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respect - at least in small organisations" (1975 p.258). Even when, 
in "The Organisation of Work" (1980), Williamson's concern is solely 
with different forms of internal organisation, there is no analysis 
of their likely atmospheric properties - he simply notes the claim of 
radical economists and the sociology of work literature that work in 
CFs may be oppressive. Moreover, and surprisingly in view of his remarks 
above, work satisfaction is treated as something to be set against 
organisational efficiency rather than as an element contributing to 
efficiency.
Thus, having identified a weakness in the literature on why firms 
exist, Williamson himself then fails to integrate atmosphere into 
his analysis of alternative types of firm. Theoretical analyses which 
do point to atmospheric differences between labour-managed and capitalist 
modes of production are to be found in the work of psychologists. This 
research suggests, according to Blumberg (1968) that utility derived 
from work depends upon the fulfilment of basic ego needs as well as 
material rewards. Participation, power and responsibility on the job, 
it is then argued, all contribute to the satisfaction of these ego 
requirements.
Investment
If the LMF is able to rent its capital on a perfect market then, 
just as with a CF, investment will be undertaken up to the point where 
its marginal value product is equated with the rental cost. However, 
it may not always be possible to rent capital. For example, Ireland
1 2 6
and Law (1982) argue that if the capital is to some degree firm 
specific then even a long-term contract may be risky for a rentier.
A second instance, emphasised by Jensen and Meckling (1979) concerns 
"intangible" components of capital such as design and advertising.
Such items by their very nature, it is argued, cannot be rented.
If the purchase price of capital is then financed from internal 
funds and if the capital is collectively owned (individual workers have 
no claim on their share) then two problems arise for the LMF. Firstly, 
the capital-labour ratio will be lower than in the rented model. This 
is variously termed the "Furubotn-Pejovich effect" (Furubotn and Pejovich, 
1970), the "underinvestment" problem (Vanek, 1975) or the "horizon 
problem" (Jensen and Meckling, 1979). It arises because members will 
require a higher rate of return on investment to compensate for the 
fact that they are unable to recoup the principal invested. The second 
problem is Vanek's (1975) "self-extinction force". This is illustrated 
in the following diagram taken from Vanek.
Figure 6.2
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Ic is assumed here that production is characterised by constant
K Kreturns to scale: Q - N.g( /^). The slope of the g( /N> schedule 
is the marginal product of capital and its height, if price is set at 
unity for simplicity, is the level of income per worker. Suppose 
the firm's capital-labour ratio happened to equal a, and hence income 
per worker is the distance ac. Self-extinction occurs first because 
a member who leaves will never be replaced (since income per worker 
increases to the right of a) and, secondly, because the consequent 
fall in the marginal productivity of capital will lead to gradual 
disinvestment. With constant returns to scale the contraction would 
continue until only one worker remained. With the more usual assumption 
of increasing followed by decreasing r e t u r n s t h e  process would 
stop short of this but production would occur in the region of increasing 
returns to scale, which is inefficient.
In Vanek's view these arguments "...are so powerful in explaining 
the shortcomings of traditional or conventional forms of producer 
cooperatives and participatory firms, that they offer an ample explanation 
of the comparative failure of these forms in history..." (1975 p.446).
However, Vanek (1975) himself recognises that the availability 
of external finance, for example from a bank, can resolve the problem.
This will be the case if repayments span the lifetime of the capital 
because it is then the current not the initial members who are paying 
the principal. There would be no difference between this and the 
renlal case. If on the other hand the repayment period is less than 
the life of the asset or if the bank only provides a proportion of the 
finance required then, as Ireland and Law (1982 pp. 49-50) demonstrate, 
the distinction between external and internal finance is reduced.^^
• w. V 7 7  • v
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Ireland and Law also consider the effect of relaxing the assumption 
that individuals have no claim on their share of capital. One alternative 
property rights structure would be to allow departing workers to sell 
their membership. If a perfectly competitive membership market existed 
then once again the investment decision will be identical to the 
rental case. However, since members could then capitalise all profits 
from membership at the outset there may be considerable trading in 
membership. In an effort to limit costly turnover the LMF may impose 
restrictions on such trading. A second possibility is that a departing 
member be permitted to remove some or all of his or her capital invest­
ment. In the latter case, and assuming perfect rental and capital 
markets, the optimal amount of investment is the same as in the rental 
model. External finance and individual ownership rights can therefore 
each at least mitigate the problems identified by Vanek and others.
Bargaining Costs During Contracting
Both LMFs and CFs typically negotiate contracts with a variety of 
parties. In most cases bargaining costs, if any, are likely to differ 
little across the two types of firm. However, with regard to contracting 
with the suppliers of labour inputs we shall argue below that there is 
a fundamental difference between labour-managed and capitalist firms.
We begin with Williamson's evaluation of the authority relation 
and peer group modes. For present purposes these are again equivalent 
to our CF and LMF respectively since the issue of whether decision­
making must be rotated in the latter is not important in the context
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of the employment contract. Under the authority relation, "...explicit 
and implicit understandings regarding the zone of acceptance of the 
employment relation (Barnard (1962).Simon (1957)) need to be reached. 
Once agreement has been reached, however, this is an essentially non 
contractual mode" (1980 p.19). The peer group mode requires membership 
affiliation and disaffiliation terms to be reached but thereafter 
requires no contracting.
In the subsequent analysis the whole emphasis is on the second- 
stage non-contractual property of the authority relation. Thus in 
terms of contracting performance it is viewed as superior to continuous 
contracting modes such as "inside contracting", but, as was seen 
earlier, equally efficient as the peer group. In the remainder of 
this section we examine whether Williamson is justified in ignoring 
the difference in the nature of first-stage contracting.
Consider first this initial contracting in the CF. Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) regard the relationship between employer and employee 
as being no different to that of grocer and customer. "The single 
customer can assign his grocer to the task of obtaining whatever the 
customer can induce the grocer to provide at a price acceptable to both 
parties. To speak of managing, directing or assigning workers to 
various tasks is a deceptive way of noting that the employer continually 
is involved in renegotiation of contracts on terms that must be 
acceptable to both parties. Telling an employee to type this letter 
rather than to file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell 
me this brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread" (1972 p.777).
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As Williamson (1975, p.67) points out, there appears to be an 
implicit assumption that the costs associated with employee turnover 
are negligible and hence employers can adapt to changes in conditions 
by filling jobs on a spot market basis. This view he rejects on the 
grounds that, although competitive conditions may prevail at the outset, 
the situation can be transformed into one involving "small numbers" 
at the contract renewal stage. This will occur if there are idiosyncratic 
skills associated with the job because the incumbent worker has a first- 
mover advantage. Given that workers will attempt to exploit this 
advantage when contracts are due for re-negotiation there will be costs 
incurred through the absorption of real resources and delays in efficient 
adaptations during bargaining. Such transactions costs arising from 
small numbers exchange are central to Williamson's account of why 
internal organisation may be more efficient than market exchange.
Williamson fails to recognise, however, that this analysis also 
implies a fundamental difference in the first-stage employment contracting 
of the CF and LMF. In the former the contract is renegotiated at 
regular intervals, often annually, and each time bargaining takes place.
In the LMF on the other hand the first-stage contract is simply an 
agreement that any surplus is distributed, according to some rule, 
between the workforce. No bargaining or subsequent re-negotiation 
takes place. This distinction assumes even more importance when we 
recognise that it is not only idiosyncratic skills which can give rise 
to small numbers exchange relations. On the employees' side a potentially 
more important source of monopoly power is the ability to organise 
collectively into trade unions. The costs that workers collectively 
can impose on an employer will in general exceed those that an individual
M fM
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can impose* On the employer1s side, a degree of monopsony power will 
accrue from the costs to workers of searching for, and moving to 
alternative work. Thus Cable and Fitzroy argue that the "traditional
firm.... becomes a bargaining arena, prone to conflict and endemic
mistrust" (1980, p.165). Moreover, the costs arising from this 
contracting process may not be limited to those incurred during the 
period of bargaining. Reich and Devine (1981), for example, argue that 
in CF's the division of labour will be pushed beyond the point that 
would otherwise be most efficient (and which the LMF will choose) in 
an attempt to limit the degree of solidarity among the workforce.
,,i ir,
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6.3. EMPIRICS
For theoretical analysis of labour-management in capitalist 
economies we have found it useful to work, for the most part, with 
"pure" forms of labour-managed and capitalist enterprises. In reality, 
however, firms exist along a spectrum between these poles, exhibiting 
a variety of decision-making and ownership structures. Moreover, whilst 
empirical work spans the whole range when taken together, each individual 
study almost invariably deals with firms within a very narrow spread.
In drawing upon this empirical literature to inform our theoretical 
analysis we must then be constantly aware of the fact that "...it may 
be misleading to think in terms of a continuous spectrum running from 
traditional profit-maximising firms at one extreme to pure worker 
cooperatives at the other, for as one moves along such a spectrum there 
may be signficant discontinuities in the effective locus of control" 
(Ireland and Law 1982 p.3).
We begin with a group of recent papers using an identical 
methodology to analyse workers' cooperatives in France, the UK and 
Italy. The French producer cooperative sector, we noted in chapter 1, 
is one of the largest in a capitalist economy. Using a sample of 440 
firms in 1978 and 520 in 1979, Defournev, Estrin and Jones (1985) 
sought to discover whether the variations in decision-making participation 
and ownership structure across these cooperatives affected their 
performance. After briefly listing some of the theoretical arguments 
they suggest that they can be interpreted as hypotheses about the sign 
of participatory variables in an augmented production function.
Participation was proxied by the proportion of workers who were 
members. Although the minimum stake required to become a member is small, 
not all workers choose to be members and hence have the right to
' --
participate in decision-making via the election of representatives 
to the governing General Assembly. In their sample the industry 
average proportions varied from 50Z in construction to more than 70Z 
in printing, although of course the range over individual enterprises 
would be greater than this.
Members of the firm, who are typically workers or ex workers, 
are required to purchase at least one share. Shares earn only a 
limited return and are repaid at par on departure. Share ownership 
beyond the minimum stake does not confer addtional voting power.
The potential relationship between enterprise performance and the 
capital stakes of workers was investigated using two variables. The 
first, CONTROL, measured the proportion of individually owned member 
capital in the hands of the workforce and the second, SHARE, normalised 
workers' stakes with respect to the total financial assets of the firm. 
Individual loans represent a further channel through which members 
can make a financial commitment to their enterprise and to capture any 
possible effects on firm performance the variable LOANS, the proportion 
of total loan capital lent by workers, was included. The final 
organisational variable, BONUS, measured the profits per head distributed 
to workers.
Production functions, incorporating these organisational variables, 
along with capital, labour and a number of other control variables, 
were estimated separately for each of the two years. Three functional 
forms (Cobb Douglas, Kmenta's CES and translog) were tried and in 
each case the procedure took account of the possibility of a simultaneous 
relationship between BONUS and performance, measured by the value-added. 
Results were reported for the functional form which performed best. In 1979
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this was the Cobb Douglas but in 1978 the translog proved slightly 
superior.
In both years the five organisational variables proved to be 
jointly significant suggesting a positive impact on performance. Taken 
individually, however, only the proxy for participation in decision­
making performed consistently well, having a significantly positive 
coefficient in both years once it was recognised that it too was 
endogenous. Two variables, SHARE and LOANS, were insignificant in 
both years whilst the others, BONUS and CONTROL were significantly 
positive in just one year. Further regressions were performed with 
the data broken down into six industrial groups. A problem here was 
that it was not possible to take account of the simultaneity revealed 
above. On the basis of OLS estimates a tentative interpretation would 
be that, while there appear to be significant differences between 
sectors, the results are broadly in line with the whole sample regressions. 
Overall, then, there are some grounds for believing that workers' 
participation in decision-making, the receipt of a share of the surplus, 
and individual capital stakes may each be positively related to enter­
prise performance, and, at worst, there is no evidence pointing to 
an inverse relationship.
Jones, (1982) conducts a similar analysis of British producer 
cooperatives over the period 1948-68. The number of enterprises, 
most of which were in either the footwear, printing, or clothing industry, 
amounted to only 48 in 1948 and 30 in 1968.
Three alternative proxies for worker participation in decision­
making were tried: the proportion of the board of management that were
worker-members, the proportion of workers who were members, and the 
proportion of members that were workers. The other two organisational 
variables included were the total share capital owned by workers and 
the total profits distributed to workers. Enterprise performance was 
measured by both value-added and value-added per worker. In contrast
to the French study only the Cobb Douglas production function was used
(8 )and no account was taken of possible simultaneity. '
In the footwear industry there was a tentative suggestion that 
worker participation on the management board leads to an improved 
performance since one performance measure, but not the other, yielded 
a significantly positive regression coefficient. This was also true 
for the printing industry but in this case splitting the sample into 
large and small firms rendered both coefficients insignificant. In 
the clothing industry the coefficient was insignificant throughout.
The second participatory variable, the proportion of workers that were 
members generally seemed to have no effect. No results involving the 
third participation proxy were reported at this stage.
The variable aiming to pick up any incentive effect of surplus 
sharing performed reasonably well. In the undivided sample, significant 
positive coefficients were obtained in printing and clothing using 
either dependent variable. When the sample was split these industries 
continued to yield significant coefficients, although not always for 
both equations, and there was also the suggestion of a positive relation­
ship in small footwear cooperatives.
The worker ownership variable was generally insignificant and 
where this was not the case (3 negative and 1 positive) it was difficult
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to discern any pattern. The evidence thus far from both UK and French 
data does not therefore lend support to Vanek's hypothesis that cooperatives 
with a high degree of internal financing will have a low and inefficient 
output. In an earlier study using the same UK footwear data Jones and 
Backus (1977) did find that the cooperatives were producing on the 
increasing returns zone of the production function and were smaller 
and less capital-intensive than comparable capitalist firms. However, 
production function estimates, of a slightly different form to the 
latter study, once again yielded evidence which did not support Vanek.
To further investigate the role of worker ownership Jones (1982) 
split the sample into low and high participatory firms using the values 
of the first two participation proxies. The results, he argues, suggest 
that in firms where participation is low worker ownership seems to 
reduce productivity, but when participation is high performance is 
enhanced by workers having capital stakes. Caution is necessary here, 
however, since the relevant coefficient was significant only in a 
minority of the formulations tried, and even then the level never 
reached 5Z. It was also at this stage that the final proxy for 
participation, the proportion of members that were workers, was 
incorporated as an explanatory variable, but it proved insignificant.
In an unpublished paper Estrin, Jones and Svejnar (1984) estimate 
an identical set of production functions using the French, UK and also 
Italian data on producer cooperatives. The requirement that the same 
equation be applied to each data set means that there is less freedom 
in estimation than in the separate studies and hence the main interest lies 
in comparisons across countries. The authors find that it is in France and 
Italy that higher levels of participation and individual financial 
commitments are most likely to enhance performance. Although the study
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did not seek to investigate the reasons for this they offer the observation 
that, in contrast to the U.K., Italy and France are "...each countries 
with relatively high degrees of participation on average as well as 
strong cooperative traditions and well-organised supporting institutions" 
(1984, p.26). The suggestion that the external environment may play 
a significant role in enterprise performance is one we have not yet 
touched upon but which features prominently in the following chapter.
We turn now to a study by Cable and Fitzroy (1980) of a sample 
of 42 West German enterprises which voluntarily adopted some degree 
of worker participation in decision-making and/or profit sharing.
They describe these firms as lying in the middle ground between the 
classical CF and worker control.
Managers in each firm were asked to provide a subjective assessment 
of the degree of worker involvement, choosing between "no participation", 
"observers", "advisors" or "active participants", in various areas of 
decision-making. This information was then used to construct an index 
of participation. Although the weighting scheme used in the construction
had no theoretical basis, the results proved to be fairly insensitive
. (9)to the choice of weights over a fairly wide range. Two further
variables of interest to us were the total profits distributed to
workers and workers' capital stakes. Pooled cross section and annual
data over the period 1974-76 was used to estimate a production function
augmented with the organisational variables in the same manner as the
papers discussed above.
The OLS estimates suggest, firstly, that participation exerted 
a positive influence on value-added. Secondly, as with the UK cooperatives.
■
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capital ownership by workers improved performance when combined with 
high levels of participation but had a negative impact when participation 
was low. Finally, the results raise the possibility that the incentive 
effects of profit sharing may also be related to participation since 
only when participation was high was there a significant (positive) 
coefficient on profits distributed to workers.
Another set of participatory enterprises in West Germany are 
those which have been required by a series of acts and laws in 1951,
1952, 1972 and 1976 to adopt a degree of codetermination. Svejnar (1982) 
used industry-level data for 14 sectors over the period 1950-1976 to 
examine whether the first three of these reforms had any effect on 
performance, the latter measured again by value-added. His results 
suggested that the 1951 law and 1952 act had no significant effect 
whilst the 1972 act may even have been mildly negative in its impact. 
Although perhaps surprising in view of the Cable and Fitzroy study, 
it may be relevant to point out that in the latter the firms voluntarily 
adopted worker participation. Also, Svejnar himself qualifies his 
findings by noting that his data is very aggregated and there were 
only a limited number of pre-1952 and post-1972 observations.
Two characteristics common to all of the above studies are the 
use of a single summary measure of performance (value-added as a proxy 
for physical output) and the reliance on a crude proxy for the level 
of participation in decision-making. In contrast the analysis of 
worker participation in Chilean state-owned enterprises by Espinosa 
and Zimbalist (1978) involves a detailed examination of the degree of 
effective participation and considers a variety of possible social 
and economic consequences.
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The period under investigation, running from the election of the 
Allende government in November 1970 to its overthrow in September 1973, 
saw a rapid expansion in the size of the state, or "social", sector.
At the time the new administration came to power there were 43 state 
enterprises of which 30 were in the industrial sector, accounting for 
6.5% of industrial employment. In the space of less than three years 
the total had risen to 420 and those in the industrial sector employed 
almost a third of the industrial workforce. Espinosa and Zimbalist 
examined a sample of 35 industrial enterprises.
Although guidelines on participatory structure had been drawn 
up by the government they were implemented unevenly and flexibly, and 
so there was considerable variation across the enterprises. An important 
point to note is that, whereas these guidelines stipulated a majority 
of state over worker representatives on the administrative council of 
each firm, in practice the workforce had a working majority in all 
cases considered.
To construct the participation index enterprises were awarded 
points according to: (i) the functioning of the formal structure 
of participation, (ii) the topics or areas discussed and (iii) the 
effective influence exercised by workers or their representatives.
For example, under (i) an enterprise would receive more points the 
larger the number of participatory bodies and the more frequently they 
met. With regard to (ii) the score would depend on the frequency with 
which topics were raised and an assessment of the intensity of workers' 
contributions to discussions. Finally, points awarded under (iii) would 
depend upon factors such as the frequency with which workers introduced
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Copies for discussion and whether, in Che event of disagreements, it 
was workers' views which prevailed. As with the Cable and Fitzroy 
study the transformation of scores into an index required subjective 
and sometimes arbitrary assessments on weighting. Tests, however, 
suggested that the index was reasonably insensitive to changes in the 
weights.
Turning now to the effects of participation, a regression of 
productivity, measured by the average annual change in output per worker 
since the passage of the enterprise into the social sector, on participation, 
employment and investment yielded a significant positive coefficient on 
participation. Espinosa and Zimbalist were also able to shed light on 
the possible sources of this relationship. First of all there appear 
to be advantages in terms of incentives and/or monitoring since absenteeism 
and the number of thefts or defective products were significantly 
negatively correlated with participation, whilst worker discipline was 
found to improve as participation increased. These findings
accord with Gunn's (1980) observation that plywood cooperatives in the 
Pacific Northwest devote fewer resources to supervision and control 
than capitalist plywood enterprises operating with identical technology. 
Secondly, there was also a significant positive association between 
participation and innovation. As noted in the theoretical discussion, 
this might reflect an increase in incentives or better channels of 
communication. The final result of interest was that the level of 
investment, which had been controlled for in the productivity equation, 
was also found to rise with participation.
f
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6.4 CONCLUSIONS
We began this chapter by exploring the various sources of an 
efficiency differential between capitalist and labour-managed production 
which have been suggested in the theoretical literature. If the ranking 
of the two organisational forms was always agreed upon and always 
the same then there would be no problem in arriving at an overall 
prediction concerning relative efficiency. This proved not to be 
the case. In terms of atmosphere and bargaining costs the discussion 
points to an efficiency advantage for LMF's. On the other hand in 
the absence of a perfect rental market for capital LMFs may be less 
efficient with regard to investment decisions than CFs. On assignment 
it was argued that there may well be gains from delegating to a 
specialist. We rejected Williamson's claim that this necessarily makes 
labour-management a "fiction" but a participatory structure to monitor 
the manager will involve costs. These will include the provision 
of information to the membership and possibly delays in response whilst 
members are informed and consulted. These however must be balanced 
against the possible gains from an increased flow of ideas from the 
production workers and an absence of resistance to change due to 
mistrust. Finally, an examination of the incentive and monitoring 
properties of the two modes of production provided no clear conclusion 
as to relative performance.
Ideally, we could look to empirical analysis to resolve the 
controversies. A number of recent studies were examined in section 6.3 
and the general picture which seemed to emerge was that "productivity" 
(usually measured by value-added) mav be enhanced by worker participation 
and/or ownership, perhaps especially when they are combined. A 
problem with a number of the studies was that the results were sensitive
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Co Che c h o i c e  o f  s p e c i f i c a C i o n  and d a c a  g r o u p in g ,  a l c h o u g h  Chere was 
s e ld o m  an y  s u g g e s c i o n  o f  a  n e g a c i v e  im p a c e .  However, e v e n  w ic h o u c  
c h i s  p ro b le m  o f  rob u sC n ess  an y  accem pc Co draw c o n c lu s i o n s  ab o u c  Che 
r e l a c i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  Che Cwo modes o f  p ro d u c c ió n  w o u ld  be s u b j e c C  
Co a  number o f  s e r i o u s  c r i c i c i s m s .
FirsCly, chere are well-known diffieulcies wich che escimacion of 
producción funecions generally. To begin wich neicher labour, capical, 
nor ouCpuC are homogeneous. There will, for example, be variacions 
in Che age and skill level of workers. Moreover, Che labour inpuC 
comprises noc only Che number of workers buC also Che hours worked 
by each of Chem and Che efforc expended per hour. AlmosC invariably, 
however, Che work reporCed above Cook simply Che number of workers in 
each enCerprise. The only excepción was Cable and FiCzroy (1980) and 
even here all chac was possible was Co discinguish blue- and whice- 
collar workers. Capical is ofeen regarded as posing even more serious 
problems. The ideal measure is capical services per unic of cime buc 
in praccice daca on capical sCock is used. Thus variacions in Che 
ucilizacion of capical and in efficiency over Che lifecime of a machine 
are neglecCed. The exisCence of differenc Cypes of ouCpuC means ChaC 
value-added is used Co proxy physical ouCpuC. This may be unsacisfacCory 
because ic comprises produce price as well as physical unics and under 
imperfecc competición boch can cause value-added Co vary. An addiCional 
consideración in Che scudies which concern us is chac "participation" 
is also difficult Co capture empirically. In regression analysis the 
error term is interpreted as representing the cumulative effect of all 
omitted variables. There is no econometric problem provided such 
variables do not influence decision-making within the firm. An example 
here would be unknown variacions in input quality. However, many of
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Che omitted variables discussed above are part of the decision-maker's 
information set and hence are likely to influence the optimal choice of 
the observed inputs. The right-hand side variables will then not be 
independent of the error term and hence biased estimates may result.
In this respect there may be more to be gained from studies such as 
that by Espinosa and Zimbalist which attempt to examine the mechanism 
through which "productivity" is affected.
Secondly, the production function is only one element determining 
the overall efficiency of an enterprise. Given the production function 
there remains the task of choosing the optimal quantities of inputs.
Even in the absence of what Williamson (1975) terms "sub-goal pursuit" 
firms may differ in their ability to attain the input combinations 
given by the first-order conditions of neoclassical models. Differences 
in, for example, assignment capabilities may show up here as well as 
in the production function. The possibility of a divergence between 
the social optimum and the outcome when individuals act in their own 
self-interest would provide a further source of efficiency differences.
Thirdly, there is the possibility that participation per se
. . . (1 2 )contributes to utility. None of the studies referred to above
attempted to incorporate "atmosphere" into their analysis but Blumberg, 
from a survey of an extensive and varied empirical literature, concludes 
"There is hardly a study in the entire literature which fails to 
demonstrate that satisfaction in work is enhanced or that other generally 
acknowledged beneficial consequences accrue from a genuine increase 
in workers' decision-making power" (1968 p.123).
Finally, as noted earlier, each of the empirical studies in 
section 6.3 considers enterprises within a fairly narrow segment of 
the range between pure capitalist and pure labour-managed production.
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As always, great care is required if predictions are to be made beyond 
the boundaries of the data set.
A number of authors side-step all of these problems by simply 
arguing that the relative sizes of the CF and LMF sectors in economies 
where both types of organisation are permitted demonstrates the superior 
efficiency of the former. This "Darwinian" argument is the subject 
of the following chapter.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
1. See Sen (1966) and Chinn (1979) for a discussion of individual 
labour supply in cooperatives.
2. Monitoring by team members will only take place up to the point 
where the marginal gains equal the marginal costs.
3. In a tightly-knit group of workers, altruism may also play a 
role. See Sen (1966).
4. Investment issues are, however, explicitly ignored. Williamson 
simply points out that Vanek and others have identified problems 
for collective ownership in this respect. These problems are 
examined below.
5. See Espinosa and Ziobalist (1978) p.149 for further discussion.
6. This generates U-shaped average cost curves for the CF.
7. It is often argued that an important ingredient in the success 
of the Mondragon cooperatives is the existence of their own 
bank, the Caja Laboral.
8. In the French study Defoumey, Estrin and Jones (1985) found 
that a failure to take account of simultaneity leads to an 
underestimate of the significance of participation and an 
overestimate of the significance of distributed profits.
9. Cable (1985a, 1985b) is currently working on the problem of 
how best to measure participation.
10. See Espinosa and Zimbalist (1978) pp. 51-55.
11. The firm with average participation tended to have about the 
same rate of absenteeism as in the pre-socialisation period, so 
low participation firms experience a deterioration whereas for 
high participation firms there was an improvement.
12. See Levin (1982) for a brief discussion.
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EFFICIENCY, DISTRIBUTION, AND THE 
DETERMINATION OF ORGANISATIONAL FORM
7.1 INTRODUCTION
A major issue in the literature on the internal organisation 
of the firm is whether organisational form is dictated by efficiency 
or distributional criteria. Thus whilst Coase (1937), Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) and Williamson (1975, 1980) have differing views on 
the nature of the firm, all agree that it is relative efficiency which 
determines the choice among organisational forms. In contrast,
Marglin (1974) argues that the rise of the factory was due not to 
any efficiency advantages but because it benefitted one group 
(capitalists) at the expense of another (workers). Similarly, Cowling 
(1982) suggests that the distinction between U-form and M-form corporate 
structures is essentially one of distribution rather than efficiency.
This chapter addresses the issue in the context of the choice 
between capitalist and labour-managed modes of production within a 
capitalist economy.
New forms of organisation may emerge in two ways: through the 
entry of new capacity, or the conversion of an established firm from 
one type of internal organisation to another. With regard to the 
former it is useful, following Scherer (1980), to distinguish between 
small-scale and large-scale entry. In the absence of scale economies
CHAPTER 7
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or if minimum efficient scale is negligibly small in relation to the 
size of the market, potential entrants can enter with an output level 
which has no effect on market price. As a result there is no strategic 
interaction between the incumbent (if any) and potential entrant. This 
allows us in Section 7.2 to focus attention on the roles of efficiency 
and distribution in determining the incentive to set up each of the 
two modes of production. Section 7.3 then examines large-scale entry 
and suggests that incumbent firms may have advantages over potential 
entrants such that the latter may be deterred even if they are more 
efficient. In the remainder of the chapter the notion of first- 
mover advantages is developed. Section 7.5 argues that problems 
concerning information and small-numbers exchange may prevent the 
conversion of an existing firm from an inefficient to an efficient 
form of organisation. Each of these two types of first-mover advantage 
relates to an incumbent firm of either type. A further possibility, 
explored in the following section is that particular types of enterprise 
may secure an advantage through the development of an accommodating 
institutional structure and technology. A short conclusion completes 
the chapter.
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7.2. SMALL-SCALE ENTRY
A necessary condition for the formation of a new firm is that, 
ignoring the possibility of mistakes, at least one of the individuals 
would become better off, with nobody suffering a decline in welfare. 
However, not only must this opportunity for gain exist, it must be 
perceived.^ Kirzner (1973) refers to this "discovery of something 
for nothing at all" (p.48) as pure entrepreneurship. The pure entre­
preneur is a decision-maker whose entire role arises out of an alertness 
to hitherto unnoticed opportunities. No other resources are necessary 
because all inputs may be hired. Other authors, however, assume that 
this alertness is combined with the ability to organise production. 
Gravelle and Rees (1981, p.151) for example refer to the central figure 
with whom all contracts are negotiated in Alchian and Demsetz's 
"classical" CF as the entrepreneur. Presumably organisational ability 
is necessary in order to decide what contracts are required. Similarly, 
Marglin (1982) in developing his analysis of the origins of hierarchy 
argues that "The capitalist's 'hold' Tover individual producers^ was 
in large part the organising ability he brought to production" (p.2).
We shall assume that "entrepreneurship" comprises both talents. One 
justification for this is that in many cases a knowledge of how production 
will be organised is required in order to evaluate whether there is 
an opportunity for gain. Secondly, it will be argued below that in 
the absence of organisational ability it is difficult to appropriate 
any rewards from pure entrepreneurship. A further assumption we shall 
make to begin with is that entrepreneurs are individuals.
Consider then an entrepreneur who has discovered an opportunity
and is contemplating whether production should be organised along 
capitalist or labour-managed lines. Let us suppose initially that 
both modes are equally efficient. Marglin (1974) was concerned with a 
very similar situation. The putting-out system, with its minute 
division of labour, was, he suggests, technically no more efficient 
than alternative ways of organising production. Rather, it served 
to provide profit for the capitalist putter-outer at the expense of 
the individual producers. If this was the case then "Why didn't 
some enterprising and talented fellow organize producers to eliminate 
the capitalist putter-outer?" The answer, Marglin argues, is that 
"....there was no profit in such a line of endeavor. If the organizer 
became a producer himself, he would have to settle for a producer's 
wage" (p.39).^
This line of reasoning can be applied to our problem as follows. 
Assume for simplicity that the only input required is labour. Two 
types of task must be undertaken whatever form the enterprise takes: 
production work and organisation. For simplicity, we assume that 
for both activities the market determined wage is w. Profit in a CF 
would be given by
f ” R - wN - F (7.1)
• (4)where N comprises one organiser and N-l production workers. The
entrepreneur has the option of running the firm personally (w is the 
opportunity cost) or hiring a manager. We shall argue below that, in 
the context of our simple CF model, the former course will be adopted.
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In a LMF the entrepreneur, along with the other members, would 
receive
N
Combining (7.1) and (7.2) we obtain
y - w ♦ %  (7.3)
This suggests, then, that if the two modes of production are 
equally efficient, capitalist organisation will be chosen because it 
enables the entrepreneur to capture all of the surplus (tt), rather 
than having to share it. What would be the effect of a difference in 
efficiency between the two types of firm? Obviously if the CF is more 
efficient it continues to be preferred. If it is less efficient then 
the outcome could go either way since the lower efficiency must be weighed 
against the above distributional advantage of capitalist production to 
the entrepreneur. Capitalist production may therefore continue to be 
preferred even if it is less efficient. Clearly, however, a sufficiently 
large efficiency differential will lead to the establishment of a 
LMF rather than CF - a share of a big pie can be better than all of 
a small one.
The analysis thus far is, however, incomplete since it fails to 
examine two possible means through which, in theory, the entrepreneur 
could do better from a LMF than has been suggested above. The first
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possibility is that the entrepreneur may be able to sell the opportunity 
that has been discovered to the membership, and the second is that 
(s)he may be able to negotiate an income differential over the other 
members .
Marglin seems to recognise this point because the passage quoted 
above continues: "His co-workers might have subscribed a dinner or gold 
watch in his honor, but it is doubtful that their gratitude would have 
led them to do much more." The crucial issue which Marglin fails to 
examine is precisely how much they would do. Given that there is assumed 
to be no efficiency difference between the two methods of production, 
the workers could pay a sum which exactly equalled the foregone profit, 
without themselves being worse off than they were before. The question 
we must consider therefore is whether a fee or income differential could 
make the entrepreneur indifferent between labour-managed and capitalist 
production, assuming once again for the moment that the modes are 
euqally efficient. That is, can the entrepreneur extract ir from 
labour-managed production?
Let us begin the analysis by assuming away the possibility of 
labour-managed production altogether, and suppose that the alternative 
facing the entrepreneur is simply whether to organise (capitalist) 
production personally or to sell the opportunity to another CF. The 
outcome is clear when it is realised that all that a pure entrepreneur 
has to sell is knowledge. Arrow (1962) then informs us that "In the 
absence of special legal protection, the owner cannot, however, simply 
sell information on the open market. Any one purchaser can destroy the
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monopoly since he can reproduce the information at little or no cost.....
With suitable legal measures, information may become an appropriable 
commodity. Then the monopoly power can indeed be exerted. However, 
no amount of legal protection can make a thoroughly appropriable commodity 
of something so intangible as information" (p.170). Thus except in 
special cases, such as where patents can be obtained, the entrepreneur 
faces the problem of incomplete property rights, or, more specifically, 
imperfect excludability. The consequence is that ". . . . the only effective 
monopoly would be the use of the information by the original possessor" 
(Arrow, 1962, p.170).
We interpret this as meaning that the entrepreneur must be the 
organiser of production, for only then can knowledge be monopolised.
The distinction between the organiser and the remaining labour inputs 
is that the former has knowledge of the enterprise as a whole whereas 
the latter know only about their constituent part.^^ Thus the 
entrepreneur can appropriate returns to pure entrepreneurship through 
personally organising production, but could not do so by attempting 
to hire the organisational talent itself.
Consider now the additional possibility of labour-managed 
production. The opportunity cannot be sold to a LMF for a fee, just 
as it could not be sold to a CF. What about the possibility of capturing 
- by performing the organisational role within a LMF? Here we come 
across the defining characteristic of labour-managed production - all 
members have a right to participate and hence a right to information.
Thus labour-managed production, unlike capitalist production, does not 
enable the entrepreneur to retain the monopoly on knowledge. In
summary, Chen, whereas previously the problem of incomplete property 
rights over knowledge was seen simply as leading to its use in production 
by the individual who initially has it rather than an attempt to sell 
it, we have shown that it also implies capitalist rather than labour- 
managed production.^  ^ Relaxing the assumption of equal efficiency 
we conclude that superior efficiency would be a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for a LMF to be established.
In the absence of entry barriers the profit available from 
capitalist organisation in a particular market will diminish over 
time, and hence so will the distributional advantage to the entrepreneur 
of capitalist over labour—managed production. Superior efficiency would 
then be sufficient for the emergence of LMFs in long-run equilibrium. The 
assumption that there are no entry barriers is a crucial one. Our 
analysis here suggests that for distributional reasons, capitalist 
production may emerge first, when the prospective entrepreneurial 
profits are large. In the following sections we argue that first- 
movers may have an advantage over subsequent potential entrants.
Up to now we have viewed the entrepreneur as an individual.
An alternative possibility is that Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) 
notion of a "team" may also be applicable to entrepreneurial activity.
Thus we mav have a group who jointly discover an opportunity and are 
jointly capable of organising production. Suppose the size of the 
team is sufficient to perform all of the tasks in the enterprise.
The group can then form a LMF and appropriate the gains from pure 
entrepreneurship. The other option would be to appoint a single 
manager and elect to work as employees within a capitalist organisation. 
However, as we have already noted the monopoly over knowledge would
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immediately be lost. Thus superior efficiency is now sufficient but 
not necessary for a LMF to be established. Vanek (1970 p. 285) 
suggests that entry by groups of individuals is most likely in sectors 
where the work involves high levels of professional skill because it 
is such workers who are most likely to possess the additional 
organisational faculties required.
If the size of the required labour force exceeds the number in 
the original team, then they have the option of admitting new members 
to the LMF or taking on hired labour. In the latter case we move away 
from pure labour-managed or capitalist production. The incentive for 
the entrepreneurial team to take on hired workers is the same as that 
for the individual entrepreneur. We should note here the possibility, 
discussed by Ben-Ner (1984) and Miyazaki (1984) that a pure LMF might 
eventually degenerate into a CF as departing members are gradually 
replaced by cheaper hired workers. However, as we remarked in the 
previous chapter, there is no guarantee that a smooth continuum exists 
between the two polar modes. Thus even if the pure LMF and pure CF 
happened to be equally efficient, there is no reason to suppose that 
the same is true of intermediate forms.
A final consideration concerns unemployment and the role of trades 
unions. In periods of unemployment unions may serve to secure a differential 
between the minimum wage that the unemploved would be prepared to accept 
and the actual wages received in CFs. If, however, LMFs can be established
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without a union presence, then they may be able to generate employment 
where it would not be profitable for a CF to operate.
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7.3. LARGE-SCALE ENTRY
Large-scale product market entry refers to a situation in which 
the existence of scale economies necessitates entry at a scale such 
that the entrant must take account of the fact that its output would, 
other things being equal, depress market price. Recent work has shown 
that under such conditions there may be an advantage to being first in 
the market. This result is of fundamental importance since, as we shall 
see, it means that the initial conditions matter in the determination 
of organisational form.
The advantage to first-movers is that they may be able to make 
commitments such that potential entrants perceive that they cannot do 
as well in the post-entry equilibrium as the incumbent achieves pre­
entry. The earliest and most well-known of this class of models assumes 
that the potential entrant expects the incumbent's output to remain 
fixed (and that the incumbent knows this to be the case). This 
particular assumption, the "Sylos Postulate", turns out to be generally 
unsatisfactory but given its familiarity it is useful to illustrate 
the essence of the argument. Dixit (1979) considers the optimal strategy 
of an incumbent CF faced with an equally efficient CF potential 
entrant. He demonstrates that in certain curcumstances the incumbent 
would choose to accommodate the entrant into the market, but in others 
it is optimal to set an output level which deters entry. In the latter 
case, which is of particular interest to us, the incumbent continues 
to earn positive profits pre-entry even although the entrant perceives 
zero post-entry profits. Furthermore, such entry deterrence may 
still be feasible and optimal if the incumbent is less efficient than
the potential entrant. The crucial point is that given the assumptions 
of the model a firm has an advantage simply by virtue of being first.
If the other firm had been first the equilibrium would be different. 
Thus, as Dixit points out: "This suggests that we should pay more 
attention to historical or even purely accidental factors when economies 
of scale are important, since they can effect industrial structure in 
a significant way" (1979, p.23). The same holds true if the potential 
entrant is a LMF rather than a CF because, as shown by Miyamoto (1980), 
the same output which deters a CF would deter a LMF of equal efficiency.
Given that the wage rate is assumed fixed, the organisational input is 
ignored for both firms, and there are no differences in job satisfaction 
in his model, this is easily seen since combining tt = R - wN - F and
R - F > > (7)v = -----  reveals that n = 0 as y = w. The problem
N
with the Sylos postulate is that if entry were to occur the established
firm would find it best to reduce output. Knowing this, the potential
entrant would not regard the threat to maintain the pre-entry level
as credible. However, a number of models have been proposed in which
the incumbent makes a commitment which is binding. The commitment
may take a number of forms, including brand selection, capacity,
innovation and advertising. They operate in the same way as would
a commitment, if it was possible, to a given level of output. Thus
the major implication, as Salop (1979) points out in his short review,
is that an incumbent may be able to deter an entrant which is of equal
(8 )or even superior efficiency. Although the models always examine
potential entry by a CF, it is clear from our argument above regarding
che Sylos postulate that a LMF would be deterred in the same manner. 
We have therefore the important possibility that CFs may be able to 
deter entry by LMFs even if the latter are more efficient.
This analysis relates to entry into the product market. In the 
case of labour-market monopsony power we suggested in Chapter 3 that 
LMFs might be less easily deterred by an incumbent CF than would 
CF potential entrants.
7.4 CONVERSION
If workers wish to buy an existing CF the purchase price must 
take account of any future stream of profits that the capitalist is 
giving up. Conversions will not therefore occur if labour-management 
is less efficient than capitalist production; but if it is more efficient 
there would appear to be the possibility of a mutually advantageous 
trade. However, it is well known in general that, under certain 
conditions, potentially advantageous exchanges may not take place 
(Gravelle & Rees 1980, pp. 504-7). Two such conditions are pertinent 
to our analysis: imperfect information concerning the good to be 
traded, and "small numbers".
Certain kinds of information about the firm may be obtained 
relatively costlessly by workers contemplating the establishment of a 
LMF. Into this category would fall, for example, the prices and 
quantities of existing inputs and outputs and the length of time which 
contracts have to run. On the other hand, information such as the 
possibility of new competitors on the horizon, forthcoming supply 
difficulties and the stock of goodwill enjoyed by the firm is much more 
difficult to obtain. The costs of acquiring such information could 
exceed the gains from trade. Turning now to the second problem, it 
is unlikely that negotiations over the sale of firms would involve 
large numbers of identical potential buyers and sellers. This is 
because, first of all, for any particular CF the existing workforce 
are likely to have superior information regarding the sorts of issues 
mentioned above to that of outsiders. Imperfect information and
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"small numbers" are therefore not necessarily independent. Secondly, 
the existing workforce already have the appropriate production skills. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, an outside group of workers 
would be faced with the problem of removing the incumbent workforce.
The situation facing the capitalist seller and LMF buyer is therefore 
one where there is a multiplicity of terms which could make one or 
both parties better off but, because of "small numbers", there is no 
exogenous market price at which they must trade. The result may be 
a period of lengthy and costly bargaining and there is the possibility 
that they may not be able to agree at all. An important point of note 
is that if there is no agreement on the sale it does not mean that the 
two parties do not trade at all. They would still be faced with the 
employment contract to negotiate and this typically involves bargaining. 
Recognition of this may make the capitalist reluctant to provide 
information which the workforce requires in order to evaluate the 
possibility of purchase because, in the event of a failure to agree 
terms, that information would weaken his or her bargaining position 
concerning the employment contract. The possibility of a continuing 
employment relation will therefore add to the difficulties of negotiating 
a sale.
Our examination of large-scale entry and of the sale of firms 
suggests that there may be advantages to being first. The first-mover 
advantage may be sufficient to outweigh some degree of inefficiency 
relative to a potential entrant or prospective purchaser. These types 
of advantage are not advantages of one particular organisational form 
over another, but advantages to the incumbent firm whatever it is.
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Thus for example a LMF may be able to deter entry by a more efficient
CF and similarly a relatively inefficient CF will not necessarily be
(9)taken over by more efficient owners. However, our interest is
with an initial situation in which all existing firms are CFs and hence 
for us the implication is that capitalist production might not be 
replaced by labour—managed production, even if the latter were more 
efficient. We now turn to another type of first-mover advantage 
which, in contrast, is specific to an enterprise type.
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7.5 TECHNOLOGY AND SUPPORTIVE INSTITUTIONS
The productive efficiency and overall performance of an 
individual firm is a function not only of its internal organisation 
but also of a variety of external factors such as the nature of technology, 
the education received by workers and capital market conditions. Enterprise 
types will differ in the particular configuration of these external 
factors that most suits them. Furthermore, technology and the characteristics 
of supportive institutions may evolve to respond to the needs of the 
existing forms of enterprise. This could be thought of as a form of 
external economy which is enterprise-type specific. There is therefore 
the possibility that in a capitalist economy the external environment 
has evolved to suit the needs of capitalist rather than labour-managed, 
or any other form of, production. Although generally requiring further 
development, a number of authors have suggested first-mover advantages 
of this kind.
An argument which is presented in considerable detail is the 
critique of the US educational system by Bowles and Gintis (1976) .
The system is viewed as supporting capitalist rather than labour-managed 
production, not through its content but rather by its form. The 
"social relations of the educational encounter ... correspond closely 
to the social relations of dominance, subordination and motivation 
in the economic sphere" (p. 265) . In other words, the fact that 
schools function in a strictly hierarchical manner serves to prepare 
individuals for the role of employee in a CF rather than a participant 
in a LMF. They suggest two mechanisms through which the requirements 
of capitalists have shaped education in the US. First, the uncoordinated
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pursuit of self interest by large numbers of individuals and small 
groups tends to lead to a more or less automatic orientation of 
educational perspectives to the requirements of capitalist production. 
Particularly in periods of high unemployment, their concern is with 
employability. Secondly, when, periodically, major educational 
debates take place, the capitalist class exerts direct influence both 
through political channels and via their control over financial 
resources for educational research. Putterman (1982) makes a similar 
point with respect to individual development on leaving education and 
entering work. In CFs there is a sharp division of labour between 
managerial and production tasks and only a small proportion of 
employees are involved in the former. Since management skills are 
largely developed on-the-job the result is that in a capitalist economy 
they are concentrated among a small section of the population. Labour- 
managed firms which require decision-making capabilities to be more 
widely dispersed than do CFs are therefore at a disadvantage.
Levin (1982) argues that, in capitalist economies, the financial 
institutions tend to favour CFs over LMFs. One reason for this is 
that they prefer some measure of control over firms that they lend to 
and with CFs this can often be achieved by joining the corporate 
board. Further difficulties of LMFs might lie in the legal system.
For example Ellerman (1984) points out that existing statutes in U.S.A. 
are typically poorly suited to the unique legal requirements of LMFs. 
Finally we may note the possibility, suggested briefly in Bowles 
and Gintis (1976) that technological change has followed a course 
appropriate to the requirements of capitalist organisation.
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If this is true then productive efficiency is itself endogenous• 
Clearly these are issues which deserve further theoretical and 
empirical attention.
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7.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined the factors which determine whether 
LMFs will emerge in a capitalist economy. Our analysis suggests that 
distributional as well as efficiency considerations are relevant.
This is the case first of all because of incomplete property 
rights over knowledge. An individual entrepreneur may be able to 
preserve a monopoly over information by personally organising production 
within a CF, but would not be able to do so in a LMF due to the fact 
that members have statutory rights to information. Superior efficiency 
is therefore a necessary but not a sufficient condition for labour- 
managed production to be chosen. The situation may, however, be reversed 
if entrepreneurship is located within a group rather than an individual. 
This possibility of inefficiency is well known when the alternatives 
facing the holder of information are to sell it or use it personally. 
Arrow points out that "...the only effective monopoly would be the use 
of the information by the original possessor. This, however, will not 
only be socially inefficient, but also may not be of much use to the 
owner of the information either, since he may not be able to exploit 
it as effectively as others" (1962 p.170). We have argued that not 
only must it be used personally but there are implications for the 
type of organisation within which it is used.
Secondly our examination of large-scale entry and conversions 
suggests that once a firm becomes established it may be able to deter 
entry by a more efficient potential entrant and would not necessarily 
be reorganised if a more efficient organisational form became available.
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Finally, first-mover advantages may accrue also to particular 
types of organisation. Whatever the reasons behind the emergence 
of capitalist production in the first place, be they efficiency or 
distributional, the fact is that the established mode of production
is now almost entirely capitalist. These are now the starting conditions
( 12)and, we have argued, this puts LMFs at a disadvantage.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
Vanek (1970 p.282) recognises this in his examination of entry 
in labour-managed economies.
Similarly Ben-Ner (1985 p.4) suggests that an entrepreneur 
will have no incentives to share the profits generated by 
the new organisation with others and therefore would establish 
a CF rather than LF.
In practice differentials do frequently exist in LMFs. See 
for example Thomas and Logan (1982) on the Mondragon group.
The organisational input is assumed not to vary with the level 
of output.
Marglin (1974) argues that this is an important consideration 
lying behind the degree of specialisation within capitalist 
enterprises.
Similarly, Marglin (1974, 1982) argued that even within a 
capitalist mode of organisation it has implications for how 
production is organised.
As we saw earlier, entry deterrence is not always optimal.
A LMF that is accommodated into the market need not necessarily 
be as efficient as the CF because of the possible distributional 
gains. This is the same point as was made in relation to 
small-scale entry.
An additional model not mentioned by Salop is Dixit (1980).
Numerous studies have shown that CFs may exhibit some degree 
of inefficiency or non-profit-maximising behaviour without 
necessarily being taken over by new (capitalist) owners.
See, for example, Scherer (1980 , p.37-38).
10.
11.
12.
Marglin makes the same point in his analysis of the rise of 
the factory system: "...the bias of technological change 
towards improvements consistent with factory organization 
sooner or later took its toll of alternatives..." (1974 p.52)
It is interesting to note that the Mondragon group of LMFs 
have their own educational and financial institutions. See 
Thomas and Logan (1982).
In "Markets and Hierarchies", Williamson explicitly states 
that the starting conditions are irrelevant to the final 
outcome: "I assume, for expositional convenience, that
'in the beginning there were markets.'... however, were the 
initial conditions to have been reversed, so that 'in the 
beginning there was central planning'... the same eventual 
configuration of transactions as between firm and market 
should be observed" (1975 pp. 20-21). (A footnote adds the 
rider that "...transactions for which neither firm nor market 
had an advantage would be assigned to the market under the 
first set of initial conditions and to the firm for the 
second").
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has examined a number of aspects of LMF behaviour 
and performance which have particular or sole relevance to those 
enterprises operating in capitalist economies. It comprises, firstly, 
a variety of explicit comparisons between labour-managed and capitalist 
firms and, secondly, explorations of interactions between the two types 
of enterprise. These interactions may take place directly in markets 
or indirectly through institutions and technology.
We began by pointing out that existing comparisons had failed 
to consider labour market imperfections and that this was surprising 
as we might expect the treatment of the labour input to be a possible 
source of differences between the two types of firm. This suggestion 
was confirmed by the monopsony analysis of chapter 2. We saw that, 
under conditions in which the CF earns positive profits, income per 
member in the LMF will exceed the wage rate received in the CF. This 
is not surprising since it is well-known that the same result obtains 
if the firms operate in a perfectly competitive labour market but 
have monopoly power in the product market. However, whereas in the 
latter case the CF employs more workers and produces a higher output 
level than theLMF, we demonstrated that with monopsony power it is 
possible that employment and output may be higher in the LMF. The 
remainder of the chapter was concerned with short-run employment 
adjustment in the LMF. Domar (1966) pointed out that if a LMF is 
prevented from reaching the peak of its income-per-member schedule 
by an upward-sloping labour supply curve then, in contrast to the
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standard Illyrian case, membership would be expanded following a price 
rise or fall in fixed costs. Obviously the "perverse" response still 
occurs if the labour supply constraint is not binding. A recent 
development has been to introduce into the standard model a requirement 
either that any departing members are entitled to compensation or 
that a vote is taken on the optimum membership size in the knowledge 
that any ensuing redundancies would be selected randomly. Our aim 
was to extend analysis of those schemes to the situation where 
monopsony power was present. If the initial position was an Illyrian 
equilibrium then, just as in the standard case without monopsony power, 
employment remained rigid following a price rise or fixed cost fall.
On the other hand, Brewer and Browning (1982) have shown that under 
alternative initial conditions a LMF may contract membership even 
when compensation has to be paid. Monopsony was of more interest here. 
Firstly, it became necessary to distinguish between schemes where 
compensation could be varied across individuals and where there was 
just a single rate. The likelihood and extent of a membership reduction 
was lower in the latter. Secondly, there was now no reason to expect 
the voting procedure to yield the same outcome as a compensation scheme 
(of either form).
The following chapter extended the analysis to oligopsony and 
labour market entry. A simple duopsony model revealed that for LMFs 
there is no systematic relationship between market structure on the 
one hand and workers' incomes and employment on the other. Furthermore, 
income differentials might exist between LMFs with identical technologies. 
Both of these features were shown to contrast with a market consisting 
of CFs. Investigation of a mixed duopsony comprising one LMF and one 
CF again revealed the absence of a systematic relationship and the
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possibility that workers may receive different amounts in the two 
firms. Finally, there was a brief analysis of entry based upon the 
Sylos Postulate. This simple treatment suggested that a strategy 
used by an incumbent CF to successfully deter entry by another CF may 
not necessarily prevent entry by a LMF. The underlying rationale is 
that an increase in the wage rate following entry represents a cost 
to a CF entrant but not to a LMF.
In chapter 4, which was joint work with Peter Law, the focus 
of attention switched to the product market. The aim was to explore 
some aspects of the interaction between profit maximising CFs and 
Illyrian LMFs using a simple duopoly model. First of all we described 
a "mixed" Cournot equilibrium comprising one firm of each type and 
derived the responses of the firms to cost and demand changes. This 
revealed that a slope-preserving increase in demand induces an expansion 
of employment and output by the CF and a contraction by the LMF. The 
"perverse" LMF response therefore persists as does the expansionary 
effect of a rise in fixed costs. This latter adjustment affects the 
CF in turn, causing it to cut employment and output. Thus in a mixed 
duopoly changes in fixed costs may lead to employment and output 
responses by the CF, whereas of course a pair of CF duopolists would 
not respond to fixed cost changes. Similarly, a rise in the wage 
rate facing the CF in our model causes it to reduce employment and 
output and the consequent increase in price induces the LMF to contract. 
The second part of the chapter considered Stackelberg leadership and 
followership. It is well-known that, under fairly general conditions, 
profit-maximising duopolists prefer to lead rather than to follow, 
but if both attempt to lead then Stackelberg disequilibrium results.
In contrast, we demonstrated with a simple example that a pair of LMFs
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may prefer followership. Again disequilibrium would result. This 
suggests the interesting possibility that in a mixed duopoly the optimal 
strategy may be for the CF to lead and the LMF to follow. This turned 
out to be the case in our example and so the mixed duopoly yielded a 
determinate Stackelberg equilibrium where one composed of homogeneous 
firm types would not.
A feature common to all three of the above chapters is that the 
behaviour of the LMF reflects perfectly the desire of the members to 
maximise their incomes. If, however, perhaps as a result of the 
concentration of managerial skills which characterises capitalist 
economies, the LMF decides to appoint a specialist manager then the 
possible implications of managerial discretion need to be explored.
This was undertaken in chapter 5 using a simple model, one version of 
which incorporated a compensation scheme. Our analysis suggested, 
first of all, that managerial discretion may have important consequences 
for short-run behaviour and secondly, that it is not only the
preferences of managers but also the nature of the constraints which 
they face which crucially determine the outcome. One result of 
particular interest was that the managerial LMF may increase output 
and membership following a price rise.
The thesis then moved on to the fundamental question of why firms 
exist, or rather why certain types of firms exist. In particular, 
we examined the factors determining whether LMFs would emerge under 
capitalism. In chapter 6  the efficiency of labour-managed and capitalist 
production was investigated. This required us to focus attention on 
the production process, the nature of contracting and the level of 
utility derived from work. The chapter began with a discussion of
the theoretical literature and sought to make a number of contributions.
First, existing discussions frequently fail to establish at the 
outset precisely what is meant by the "efficiency" of an enterprise.
We therefore put forward a definition. A second characteristic of 
the literature is the diversity of approaches. To facilitate a 
comprehensive evaluation we suggested a number of broad categories 
to which the various arguments could be allocated, and showed how 
each related to overall enterprise efficiency. Thirdly, specific 
criticisms were directed at Williamson's (1980) analysis of relative 
contracting costs. Finally, it was argued that whereas the notion of 
"atmosphere" played an important role in Williamson's (1975) examination 
of the relative efficiency of firms and markets, its treatment in his 
subsequent evaluation of different modes of internal organisation was 
unsatisfactory. We argued that "atmosphere" should be accorded equal 
status with other contributors to overall efficiency and that, on 
theoretical grounds, we would expect non-trivial differences between 
capitalist and labour-managed production.
The investigation of theoretical arguments failed to yield a 
clear prediction on the relative efficiency of the two modes of 
production. We then turned to the empirical literature. The general 
picture which seemed to emerge was a suggestion that "productivity" 
(usually measured by value-added) may be enhanced by worker participation 
and/or ownership, perhaps especiallywhen they are combined. A problem 
with many of the studies was that the results were sensitive to Lhe 
choice of specification and data grouping, although there was seldom 
any suggestion of a negative impact. However, even without this 
problem of robustness we argued that any attempt to draw conclusions
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about the relative efficiency of capitalist and labour-managed organis­
ational forms is subject to a number of serious criticisms.
Firstly, as in all empirical work on production functions there 
are difficulties associated with the measurement of enterprise output 
and the inputs of labour and capital. The measurement of participation 
then presents an additional problem. Since labour, capital and the 
degree of participation are endogenous to the firm there is a possibility 
that their coefficients may be biased. Secondly, the production function 
captures only one element of enterprise efficiency. A further task 
facing the firm is to choose the optimum levels of the various inputs.
The latter objective is frequently termed "economic efficiency" and 
is distinct from "technical efficiency" which is captured by the 
production function. Thus various of the theoretical arguments may 
correctly identify differences in enterprise efficiency but need not 
necessarily be picked up by an augmented production function. Thirdly, 
little attention was paid to the possibility that participation per se 
(or "atmosphere") contributes directly to utility and hence efficiency. 
Finally, we noted the danger of attempting to assess capitalist and 
labour-managed production on the basis of evidence from studies each 
of which was confined to firms along only a small section of the range 
between the pure capitalist and pure labour-managed enterprise.
Finally, in chapter 7, we considered whether the choice among the 
organisational forms depended only upon their relative efficiency 
or whether distributional considerations were also important. Our 
analysis suggested the latter to be the case. The role for distribution 
arose first of all because of the entrepreneur's concern to maintain 
a monopoly over knowledge and secondly because, once established, 
individual enterprises and also types of enterprise may secure first- 
mover advantages.
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A number of the issues examined in the thesis would appear to merit 
further attention. First, there is the interaction between LMFs and 
CFs in product markets. In chapter 4 we looked at a Cournot duopoly 
and Stackelberg leadership-followership. An alternative structure 
to consider is one involving a dominant firm and competitive fringe. 
Saving (1970) analysed such a situation where all firms sought to 
maximise profits. At the present juncture in capitalist economies the 
most interesting mixed case would comprise a dominant CF facing a LMF 
fringe. Returning to the Cournot model, an interesting extension 
might be to replace an Illyrian LMF with some form of managerial model, 
perhaps that suggested in chapter 5. This would relate to recent work 
by Vickers (1984) in which it was demonstrated that a firm controlled 
by a management whose utility derived from sales as well as profit may 
actually earn higher profits than a pure profit-maximising firm. A 
third aspect of product market interaction worthy of investigation is 
collusion. The literature on CF oligopoly has suggested various 
factors, for example, cost and demand heterogeneity, which might hinder 
collusion. Similarly it might be interesting to consider the possible 
implications of heterogeneous organisational forms.
The analysis of market interactions between the two types of firm 
may also need to take account of entry and exit. Chapter 3 briefly 
considered labour market entry deterrence based upon the Sylos postulate. 
As was pointed out, recent work on entry has criticised this model 
because the threat to maintain the pre-entry output level lacks 
credibility. Attention has shifted to the role of sunk costs in 
generating credible threats. In chapter 7 we discussed in general terms 
the advantage which the ability to make such commitments may confer 
upon incumbents. The development of formal models involving the two
• »
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types of firm is an important area for future research. As already 
noted, the various arguments concerning the role of institutions in 
the determination of organisational form require further development.
It is relevant to note here the recent emergence of a literature, under 
the heading "The New Institutional Economics", which attempts to 
encompass the analysis of the role of institutions within the neo­
classical paradigm. ^ ^Finally, an empirical investigation of the 
determinants and consequences of entry and exit which distinguished 
labour-managed and capitalist firms would constitute an important 
contribution to the debates contained in chapters 6  and 7.
types of firm is an important area for future research. As already 
noted, the various arguments concerning the role of institutions in 
the determination of organisational form require further development.
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the heading "The New Institutional Economics", which attempts to 
encompass the analysis of the role of institutions within the neo­
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
1. See for example the Symposium in the Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics (Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staats­
wissenschaft), March 1984.
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